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Abstract 
Encrypted data transmission is becoming increasingly more important as information security 
is vital to modern communication networks. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is a promising 
method based on the quantum properties of light to generate and distribute unconditionally 
secure keys for use in classical data encryption. Significant progress has been achieved in the 
performance of QKD point-to-point transmission over a fibre link between two users. The 
transmission distance has exceeded several hundred kilometres of optical fibre in recent years, 
and the secure bit rate achievable has reached megabits per second, making QKD applicable 
for metro networks. To realize quantum encrypted data transmission over metro networks, 
quantum keys need to be regularly distributed and shared between multiple end users. Optical 
switching has been shown to be a promising technique for cost-effective QKD networking, 
enabling the dynamic reconfiguration of transmission paths with low insertion loss. 
In this thesis, the performance of optically switched multi-user QKD systems are studied using 
a mathematical model in terms of transmission distance and secure key rates. The crosstalk and 
loss limitations are first investigated theoretically and then experimentally. The experiment and 
simulation both show that negligible system penalties are observed with crosstalk of -20 dB or 
below. A practical quantum-safe metro network solution is then reported, integrating optically-
switched QKD systems with high speed reconfigurability to protect classical network traffic. 
Quantum signals are routed by rapid optical switches between any two endpoints or network 
nodes via reconfigurable connections. Proof-of-concept experiments with commercial QKD 
systems are conducted.  Secure keys are continuously shared between virtualised Alice-Bob 
pairs over effective transmission distances of 30 km, 31.7 km, 33.1 km and 44.6 km. The 
quantum bit error rates (QBER) for the four paths are proportional to the channel losses with 
values between 2.6% and 4.1%. Optimising the reconciliation and clock distribution 
architecture is predicted to result in an estimated maximum system reconfiguration time of 20 s, 
far shorter than previously demonstrated. 
In addition, Continuous Variable (CV) QKD has attracted much research interest in recent 
years, due to its compatibility with standard telecommunication techniques and relatively low 
cost in practical implementation. A wide band balanced homodyne detection system built from 
modified off-the-shelf components is experimentally demonstrated. Practical limits and 
benefits for high speed CVQKD key transmission are demonstrated based on an analysis of 
noise performance. The feasibility of an optically switched CV-QKD is also experimentally 
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demonstrated using two virtualised Alice-Bob pairs for the first time. This work represents 
significant advances towards the deployment of CVQKD in a practical quantum-safe metro 
network. A method of using the classical equalization technique for Inter-symbol-interference 
mitigation in CVQKD detection is also presented and investigated. This will encourage further 
research to explore the applications of classical communication tools in quantum 
communications. 
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
1.1 Brief introduction to cryptography   
Cryptography is a field of applications allowing the transfer of confidential communications in 
the presence of unauthorised parties called eavesdroppers [1]. A standard cryptographic system 
consists of a message space M, a ciphertext space C, a key space K and a pair of 
encryption/decryption algorithms E/D [2]. As shown in Figure 1.1, an ordinary message (also 
known as plaintext) m_∈ M from the sender (conventionally named 'Alice') is encrypted with 
additional information referred to as the 'key' k_∈ K based on an encryption algorithm E. The 
encrypted message (called the ciphertext or cryptogram) c=E(m,k) _∈ C is sent to the receiver 
(conventionally named 'Bob') through an insecure channel. Bob conducts the reverse operation 
and employs a decryption algorithm together with the key to retrieve plaintext from the 
ciphertext he reviewed, ie. m=D(c,k). During the transmission of secret information, there 
would be a potential unauthorised third party (commonly known as ‘Eve’) attempting to 
retrieve the transmitted ciphertext [1-3]. A secure cryptographic system should be able to 
protect the ciphertext from Eve’s attacks, and the security must rely on keeping the changeable 
key secret rather than a undisclosed encryption/decryption algorithm [2, 4]. 
 
Figure 1.1 Illustration of a basic cryptographic solution 
Cryptography has a long history of war with cryptanalysis, which is the study of 
eavesdropping [1, 5]. Research has been conducted to build more secure cryptographic systems, 
while techniques are also developed and improved to break them. The breakthrough happened 
in 1917, when the so-called ‘one-time pad’ (OTP) cryptosystem was introduced by Vernam [6]. 
OTP is a symmetrical cryptographic solution/protocol, as a randomly generated key must be 
securely shared between Alice and Bob in advance. The ciphertext c can be then produced by 
Alice by combining the key k and original plaintext m: c=m⊕k, where ⊕ is a bitwise exclusive 
Encryption
E
Decryption
D
KEY
k∈ K
Plaintext
m∈M
Ciphertext
c=E(m,k)∈C
Plaintext
m∈M
Eve
Alice Bob
KEY
k∈ K
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OR operation. As Bob has the same key, he can decrypt the ciphertext by the calculation: c⊕k 
=m⊕k⊕k= m. This process requires the key to be the same length as the transmitted message 
[1, 2, 6]. In principle, OTP is proven to be unbreakable as long as the random keys are not 
reused [7]. However, the secure distribution of the non-reusable large-size key cannot be 
practically guaranteed over an insecure transmission channel. Although the algorithm is 
provably secure, the cryptographic system would collapse if Eve is able to reveal the key. The 
same problem also exists in the implementation of other symmetrical cryptographic systems, 
such as Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), and Data Encryption Standard (DES), even 
though they require fewer shared keys [1, 5].  
Another class of classical cryptography is commonly called public-key or asymmetrical 
cryptographic systems, which aims to avoid this problem [1].  In public-key cryptography there 
is no need to securely distribute the key between Alice and Bob. Instead, Bob publicly 
announces a public key which is computed from a pre-prepared private key. Alice then encrypts 
her plaintext into ciphertext using the public key and sends it back to Bob, who is the only one 
able to decrypt this ciphertext with his private key. Any potential Eve in the middle would face 
enormous challenges, requiring complicated calculations to decode the message. Indeed, the 
security of public-key cryptographic systems is based on assumptions about the limits of Eve’s 
computational capability, also commonly known as computational security [1, 8]. The most 
typical example is the Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman (RSA) algorithm [9]. Firstly, Bob 
randomly uses two different prime numbers p and q to generate a public key as a pair of integers 
(e,n), where n= pq and e satisfies gcd(e,ɸ(n))=1, and ɸ(n)=(p-1)(q-1). p and q are kept secure, 
but the public key can be shared with Alice via an insecure classical channel. The private key 
can then be obtained by Bob as d≡1(mod ɸ(n))/e. The information m encrypted by Alice as 
C=Me(mod n) can be decrypted by Bob using   M≡Cd(mod n). When Eve attempts to calculate 
the private key using the information, she faces a great challenge in factoring the number n [9]. 
For example, factoring a 232-decimal digit number took two years and employed hundreds of 
machines [2].Therefore, the security relies on Eve’s limited ability to factor large integers. 
Whilst this can currently be considered a reasonable assumption currently for very large 
integers, the future advent of sufficiently powerful quantum computers could easily break 
today’s cryptographic systems [10, 11]. 
The field of cryptography is becoming more and more important as information security plays 
a vital role in modern communication networks. We should be severely concerned with the 
security of communication when we access our personal information online such as banking 
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data [12]. Although today’s cryptographic systems are able to provide security under 
computational complexity assumptions, which is referred to as ‘computational secure’ , a 
countermeasure needs to be prepared for more powerful Eves in the near future [1, 5].  
1.2 Quantum Key Distribution 
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is a promising solution for unconditional secure 
cryptography due to its ability to ensure secure key distribution via insecure channels by virtue 
of quantum mechanics. It was invented by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 [13]. Generally 
speaking, in a QKD system, Alice and Bob obtain the key from shared random bits encoded in 
the quantum states of particles, e.g. photons. Those encoded bits are commonly known as 
‘qubits’ (quantum bits) [14]. The security of QKD is fundamental thanks to the Quantum Non-
Cloning Theorem, which states that an unknown quantum state cannot be identically duplicated 
[15]. Any attempt at eavesdropping by Eve inevitably disturbs the transmitted quantum states, 
which could then be detected by Bob. As the distributed key is guaranteed to be secure, it can 
be used in symmetrical cryptographic algorithms such as OTP to achieve unconditionally 
secure cryptographic systems, in which the security does not rely on unproven mathematical 
assumptions [5]. QKD was first experimentally demonstrated in 1992 by distributing a key 
encoded in photons states between Alice and Bob [16], and it has been widely researched in 
the optical communications field over the last two decades. An increased number of protocols 
have also been developed.  
In general, current protocols can be grouped into two main classes: Discrete Variable (DV) 
protocols and Continuous Variable (CV) protocols. In DV QKD, transmitted random bits are 
encoded in discrete phase or polarisation states of single photons, and single photon detection 
is used for measuring their quantum states. On the other hand, CV QKD employs the 
quadratures of the electromagnetic field to carry the bit information, and measurements are 
conducted based on coherent detection (e.g. Homodyne detection). This thesis does not cover 
the full range of QKD protocols. The representative DV and CV protocols used in the work of 
this thesis are introduced in this section.  
1.2.1 DV QKD protocols 
DV protocols are the original approach to QKD. The earliest and the best known QKD protocol 
is BB84 which was first conceived in 1984 by Bennett and Brassard [13]. The principle of 
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BB84 can be illustrated using Table 1.1. Alice encodes her random bit sequence in the 
polarisation of a train of single photons using two randomly chosen bases: the rectilinear (+) 
and diagonal (×) bases, as shown in Figure 1.2. As a result, each bit is encoded as a polarised 
single photon in one of four possible polarisation states: horizontal, vertical,  -45° and 
+45° [17]. Alice and Bob agree that a photon polarised horizontally or at +45° represents bit 
value ‘0’, while photons polarised vertically and at -45° stand for bit value ‘1’. The polarised 
photons are then sent to Bob via a quantum channel. Bob conducts polarisation measurements 
using two polarisation analysers which correspond to the diagonal basis and rectilinear basis. 
He chooses one of analyzers/bases randomly to measure each photon from Alice. For each 
photon detection, there is a 50% possibility of getting an error when the basis chosen by Bob 
is different from Alice’s selection, as the ‘0’ and ‘1’ cannot be distinguished by the wrong 
base [17].   
 
Figure 1.2 Bit encoding with two bases in BB84 
After detecting all photons, Alice and Bob then communicate over an insecure public channel 
to let each other know the sequence of bases they used without sharing the bit values that were 
sent or received.  To sift errors out, the bits detected when Alice and Bob used different bases 
are discarded, and the remaining bit sequence is called the ‘sifted key’ [1]. The sifting process 
is also illustrated in Table 1.1. The sifted keys recorded by Alice and Bob are ideally the same, 
but additional error will be caused by imperfections of practical devices or possibly by Eve’s 
intercept. The ratio of the number of different bits of the sifted key between Alice and Bob to 
the total length of sifted key is normally represented as the quantum bit error rate (QBER) [1, 
18]. As the presence of eavesdropping will inevitably increase the number of error bits, Alice 
and Bob publicly share a fraction of the sifted key to evaluate the QBER, and hence the 
existence of Eve. If the QBER is higher than a predefined threshold, the corresponding key 
Bit 0
Bit 0
Bit 1
Bit 1
Rectilinear Basis (+)
Diagonal Basis (×) 
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fraction will not be used. The final secure key can be then obtained from the rest of the sifted 
key by classical post processing [14]. Despite encoding the bit information in the polarisation 
of photons, phase encoding has been shown as an alternative and more practical scheme for 
fibre communication, which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2.  
Table 1.1 Illustration of a basic BB84 protocol 
Alice's 
random bits 
Alice's 
basis 
Sending 
polarisations 
Bob's 
basis 
Received 
bits 
Public 
discussion  
Sifted 
key  
0 +  + 0 Same basis 0 
0 ×  + 1   
1 +  × 1   
0 +  + 0 Same basis 0 
1 ×  × 1 Same basis 1 
1 +  × 1   
0 ×  + 1   
1 ×  × 1 Same basis 1 
Ideally, a single photon source is required for preparing the sending states. However, regarding 
the practical generation of single photons, since the technology for true single photon 
generators is still under development [19, 20], DV-QKD systems generally employ highly 
attenuated pulsed lasers as photon sources, of which the average optical power is at sub single 
photon level. The problem with this method is that a small number of the emitting pulses have 
more than one photon, if even the average power is less than one photon per pulse.  
This problem opens the possibility that Eve may perform what is called the photon number 
splitting (PNS) attack [21]. Eve can split and store one photon from these multi-photon pulses 
and transmit the rest to Bob. Therefore, she would be able to read some or all of the key after 
learning the base information from the public channel without introducing additional QBER. 
As a promising solution for defending from PNS attack, the idea of a ‘decoy state’ was first 
proposed by Hwang [22] in 2003 as a modification of the BB84 protocol. A similar idea was 
also later applied to other protocols. In this method, in addition to generating weak pulses (i.e. 
‘signal’ or ‘key’ pulses) as in the standard BB84 protocol, Alice also prepares some additional 
‘decoy’ pulses which have a different mean photon number per pulse, and hence a different 
possibility distribution. ‘Decoy’ pulses are randomly mixed in position with the original pulses 
and sent to Bob.  Eve is not able to tell the difference between the signal pulses and the decoy 
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state pulses. Attempts at PNS can be then realized by investigating the QBER and yields of the 
decoy pulses [18, 23]. Following this work, a more efficient variation of the decoy state BB84 
was developed as the so-called 'T12' protocol [24], in which two bases are selected with uneven 
possibilities depending on system characteristics.    
A more practical way of implementing DVQKD, the coherent-one-way (COW) protocol has 
been conceived [25]. Instead of coding bit information on individual pulses, COW uses the 
coherence between the transmitting photon pulses.  Alice encodes each random bit in a two-
pulse sequence consisting of a vacuum and a single-photon-level pulse. To improve the security, 
decoy states, consisting of two successive laser pulses with the same energy levels, are 
randomly added to the sequence [26]. When transmitted to Bob, bit information can be then 
measured by determining the arrival time of the photons, and the existence of Eve is detected 
by monitoring the coherence between consecutive photon pulses [14]. The security of DVQKD 
systems has been rigorously proven [14, 23, 27-29]. A more detailed security analysis and 
practical QKD setup is given in Chapter 2. 
1.2.2 CV QKD protocols 
The CV QKD protocol is much recent, and was introduced in 1999 by Ralph [30]. It uses the 
amplitude and phase quadratures of a coherent laser to encode the bit information, therefore 
single photon detection is replaced by coherent detection consisting of classical photodiodes. 
As these sources and receivers are cost-effective and more compatible with standard 
telecommunication techniques, this has attracted a lot of research interest in recent years. 
Several protocols based on continuous variables have been proposed and demonstrated 
experimentally [31-35]. Among these, the Gaussian modulated coherent state protocol (GMCS 
or GG02) [31] has been widely investigated and mostly implemented. It has been thoroughly 
analyzed and proven to be secure against collective attacks [36] and general attacks [37]. In 
GMCS, Alice first prepares N pairs of random numbers XA = {X1, X2 ... XN} and PA={P1 , P2 ... 
PN }. Both XA and PA follow a Gaussian distribution Ɲ(0, VA), with a variance VA  and a mean 
of zero. This is the distribution that offers maximised information rate in a noisy channel [38]. 
She then prepares a sequence of coherent states|𝛼⟩ = |𝑋𝐴 + 𝑖𝑃𝐴⟩ and then sends it to Bob via 
a quantum channel. The preparation of Gaussian modulated coherent states can be visualised 
in Figure 1.3. 
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Figure 1.3 Illustration of Gaussian modulated coherent states in GG02 
Bob randomly chooses to measure either quadrature X or P of the received states using coherent 
detection, from which he gets a corresponding sequence of numbers. Then he announces his 
choice of quadrature measurement to Alice publicly, so that she can do the sifting and store 
only the random numbers used in the modulation of correlated quadratures. Alice and Bob 
randomly sample and reveal a fraction of their strings of numbers and use it to estimate the 
channel transmittance and excess noise, and hence evaluate the amount of information mutually 
shared between Alice and Bob and the maximum information available to Eve [31, 39]. The 
evaluation is further explained in the secure key analysis in the next chapter. After this, the 
final secure key can be distilled from non-revealed numbers between Alice and Bob (i.e. the 
sifted key) by performing classical post processing (i.e. error correction and privacy 
amplification). The practical implementation and security analysis of a GMCS QKD system is 
given in Chapter 2. 
1.2.3 Post processing 
Despite the employed protocol, Alice and Bob would have a large number of sifted keys after 
quantum channel transmission. However, the key at this point has a certain QBER level, which 
is due to system imperfections and possible interception by Eve. Practically, all errors are 
regarded as the result of Eve’s presence, as Alice and Bob would not be able to distinguish the 
causes of errors. Therefore, Alice and Bob have to involve post processing via a classical 
channel to correct the errors as well as reduce the information available to Eve. The final secret 
key is then decided after this procedure. Although post processing is a necessary step in QKD, 
its basic idea and technique is in common with classical communication and not exclusive to 
quantum physics.  
X
P
X
P
Probability distribution
Gaussian 
modulation
XA = {X1, X2 ... XN}
PA  = {P1 , P2 ... PN }
Coherent sates 
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The first step is called error correction (EC), which is also known as information reconciliation, 
making Alice’s and Bob’s bits identical. In general, Alice and Bob agree on a EC code first 
(e.g. a low-density parity check (LDPC) code [40]), and then EC can be practically conducted 
in either of two directions. In ‘direct reconciliation’ (DR), Bob corrects his bits based on the 
classical EC information sent from Alice. In ‘reverse reconciliation’ (RR), Alice corrects her 
bits based on the classical EC information sent from Bob [14, 41]. DR and RR affect the 
security key analysis of CV QKD systems, but make no difference to DV systems. At the end, 
EC results in a shortened but perfectly correlated key between Alice and Bob.  
Since Alice and Bob conduct EC over an insecure classical channel, some part of the 
information can possibly be obtained by Eve. This needs to be solved by the second step of 
post processing following the EC process: privacy amplification (PA) [42]. PA is a method of 
eliminating the information leaked to Eve [14, 43]. In general, Alice and Bob publicly share a 
random hash function, and each of them applies it to the error corrected key. The resulting key 
will be compressed to a shorter length but still be identical between Alice and Bob, while Eve’s 
knowledge of the key will be greatly minimised.  
1.3 Overview of QKD in fibre-optic communication: from single 
link to network 
From a practical point of view, since the first experimental demonstration of a QKD system in 
1992 [16], both DV and CV QKD have been widely demonstrated over standard single mode 
fibre (SSMF), and significant progress has been achieved in the performance of point-to-point 
(PTP) links. For QKD systems with DV protocols, the maximum transmission distance 
between Alice and Bob has been extended to over hundreds of kilometres of optical fibre [29], 
and the secure bit rate achievable has reached megabits per second (Mbps) over 50 km [44]. 
On other hand, recent experimental demonstrations of CV QKD point-to-point GMCS 
CVQKD have shown key distribution using SSMF over increased transmission distances of 
80 km [45] and 100 km [46], or with a secure bit rate in the range of Mbps [47]. Such 
achievements make QKD applicable in both metropolitan backbone and access 
telecommunication networks [26].  
In order to realize QKD encrypted data transmission in a metro area and establish a quantum 
safe network, the first thing is to make sure that quantum keys can be properly distributed and 
shared between multiple users. Currently, multi-user QKD systems (or QKD networks) are 
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realized based on three main types of elements: passive splitters, trusted repeaters, and optical 
switches, all of which have advantages and disadvantages. These topologies are shown in 
Figure 1.4. A multi-user QKD (or QKD network) experiment was first demonstrated by 
Townsend et al. [48], using a passive optical splitter to realize point-to-multipoint quantum key 
transmission. Optical splitters were then implemented in passive QKD networks by many 
research groups [49-52]. Although QKD networks based on this technology have low network 
complexity and low cost, they all share two major weaknesses: the connections cannot be 
selected on demand, and the number of users is limited owing to the loss from passive splitters. 
The use of trusted repeaters has been shown to be a much simpler and scalable technique to 
establish QKD networks from fixed point-to-point links [53-55]. However, they are practically 
expensive and, similar to passive splitters, less reconfigurable. Optical switching has been 
shown to be an alternative technique for cost-effective QKD networking, enabling the dynamic 
reconfiguration of transmission paths with low insertion loss. The earliest optically-switched 
QKD system was demonstrated by Toliver et al. [56], in which a secure key was established 
between Alice and Bob through different types of optical switching elements, such as 
microelectromechanical (MEMS), Lithium Niobate (LiNbO3), and optomechanical 
switches [56]. Optical switching has since been employed in multiuser QKD systems in lab 
and field environments [57-62]. These techniques cannot be used to extend the QKD 
transmission distance. Such a problem can be solved by adding trusted repeaters into switched 
QKD systems [63]. An optical switching technique can be predicted to be the most promising 
candidate in the practical realization of reconfigurable multiuser QKD with minimum 
infrastructure. Most efforts in the investigation of QKD networks have been made for DV QKD 
protocols, CVQKD networks based on simple point-to-point configuration have been not 
demonstrated until recently [26, 64].   
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Figure 1.4 Paradigms of a multi user QKD system based on (a) passive splitting; (b) PTP 
trusted repeating; (c) optical switching 
Another step towards a metro quantum safe network is the deployment of multiuser QKD 
systems in the existing metro network, thanks to the previous studies into the feasibility of the 
“co-existence scheme”, in which a quantum signal and classical signals are simultaneously 
transmitted through the same optical fibre using a wavelength division multiplexing (WDM) 
and narrow band filtering (NBF) technique [39, 61, 65-67]. Although some recent research 
suggests the possibility of practical integration of switched QKD in current metro networks 
[68, 69], there is still a lack of detail regarding the practical application of a switched multiuser 
QKD in a realistic metro network.  
1.4 Motivation 
This thesis focuses on the implementation of practical quantum encrypted (quantum-safe) 
communications in a metro network, integrating optically-switched QKD systems with high 
reconfigurablility to protect classical network traffic. Although PTP QKD in fibre-optic 
communications has become a mature technology ready for practical use in cryptographic 
systems, there are still a number of challenges and loopholes in the practical application of 
QKD in existing metro telecommunication networks.    
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Alice  2
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Optical
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Bob 1 
Bob 2
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To establish cost-effectively multiuser QKD systems to provide secure reconfigurable network 
communications between multiple parties, optical switching techniques may be applied 
between QKD end-points, reducing the amount of deployed hardware. However, as the weak 
quantum signals are very sensitive to loss and noise, any optical switch used in routing quantum 
signals will more or less degrade the secure bit rate of each user. The loss and crosstalk 
limitations of optically switched QKD systems need to be investigated, not only to illustrate 
their feasibility but also to set criteria for the design or selection of switch components in QKD 
systems.  
The deployment of optically switched QKD in today’s network still needs further investigation. 
A practical solution needs to be drawn for effectively integrating reconfigurable QKD in the 
existing metro network to secure classical data traffic, in which the quantum channel and hence 
the secure key transmission can be switched between multiple network users. In addition, the 
system reconfiguration time would significantly limit the reconfigurability of the network and 
reduce the overall quantum key transmission speed. However, this is either not fully mentioned 
or for relatively long (in many minutes) in the demonstrated practical QKD systems and 
networks. The method for reducing reconfiguration time in the optically switched QKD metro 
network needs to be developed. 
In addition, there has not been a demonstration of an optically switched CVQKD system so far. 
This may be owing to its relatively poor practical performance as the system speed of most 
CVQKD demonstrations is still 1 MHz. Therefore, the feasibility of higher speed CVQKD 
systems needs to be investigated, and hence enable their implementation in reconfigurable 
quantum-safe metro networks.  
1.5 Thesis organisation  
The organisation of this thesis is as follows:  
Chapter 1 gives a general introduction of QKD and its role in cryptography. Some of the 
typical DV and CV protocols are explained. Research on moving QKD PTP links towards 
QKD networks is briefly overviewed. The motivation and contribution of this thesis are 
described.   
Chapter 2 reviews the different approaches of practical PTP implementations using DV and 
CV QKD protocols. A detailed security key analysis is also provided. The different 
12 
 
performances of DV and CV QKD links in term of their secure key rate and transmission 
distance is modelled and discussed.   
Chapter 3 first introduces optical switch techniques and reconfigurable networks. A security 
key analysis of switched QKD systems is carried out. The feasibility and limitations of a basic 
reconfigurable multi-user QKD system are studied. The performance of QBER of QKD paths 
(based on the BB84 protocol) through optical switches is predicted using the security key 
analysis, and a series of proof-of-principle experiments are carried out featuring additional 
emulated switch losses and crosstalk from an interferer.   
Chapter 4 demonstrates an effective quantum-safe network solution which integrates 
reconfigurable QKD into a realistic metro network. The proposed network architecture and the 
operational principles of both dynamic key sharing and data encryption are described. A series 
of proof-of-concept experiments demonstrate the feasibility of a switched multi-node QKD 
system with reduced reconfiguration time within this architecture. Experimental results are 
shown and discussed. 
Chapter 5 first discusses the feasibility of achieving high speed CV-QKD with a practical 
wideband balanced homodyne detection (BHD) system. The limitations and benefits of high 
clock rate CVQKD systems are illustrated by analysing the noise performance at different 
system speeds. With a GHz BHD, the feasibility of an optically switched CVQKD system is 
experimentally demonstrated. In addition, a method of using equalization in CVQKD detection 
to mitigate inter-symbol-interference is proposed and investigated.  
Chapter 6 summarises the work undertaken in this project so far, and draws conclusions. 
Possible future work is also discussed.  
1.6 Novel contributions  
The main works that have been carried out during the author’s PhD study are as follows:  
• A mathematical model describing an optically switched QKD system was constructed, 
which is derived from the general secure key analysis for point to point links. In this model, 
the optical switch used in the system is featured as an additional channel loss and crosstalk, 
which inevitably degrades the QKD performance. Based on this model, the degradation in 
QBER and hence the secure key rate caused by optical switches in a reconfigurable QKD 
system was theoretically investigated. In addition, a series of proof-of-concept experiments 
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was conducted, which verified the mathematical model as well as studied the feasibility and 
limitations of an optically switched QKD system.  
• A novel quantum-safe network solution was demonstrated, which cost-effectively 
integrates reconfigurable QKD into current metro networks. This solution also offers the 
potential for rapidly switching the quantum channel between multiple users and then 
immediately resuming secure key transmission between different Alices and Bobs. The 
feasibility of the proposed network scheme was experimentally demonstrated using 
commercially available QKD devices. In this experiment, one common Bob continuously 
shared secure keys with four virtualised Alices, via an opto-mechanical switch with four 
different path attenuations corresponding to transmission distances of 30 km, 31.7 km, 33.1 km 
and 44.6 km. The average QBER for the four paths were obtained as 2.6%, 3.2%, 3.6% and 
4.1%, with secure key rates of around 1.8×103, 1.6×103, 1.3×103, and 0.7×103 bits/s being 
obtained, respectively. A maximum reconfiguration time of 20s was predicted within this 
proposed network solution, far shorter than previously demonstrated. 
• A theoretical analysis of repetition rate-dependent noise performance in CVQKD 
systems was conducted for the first time. The noise sources which behave proportionally to the 
system repetition rate were categorised and investigated. Based on this analysis, the noise 
behaviours and hence the feasibility of the high speed CVQKD system was evaluated. In 
addition, a GHz BHD, which was built using modified commercial components, was 
experimentally demonstrated in term of its feasibility in a CVQKD protocol.  
• With this BHD, the feasibility of an optically switched high speed (250 MHz) GMCS 
CVQKD system was experimentally demonstrated. This part of the work was conducted in 
collaboration with Dr. Rupesh Kumar. The quantum signal transmission was routed between 
two virtualised Alice-Bob pairs. The secure key rates are predicted to be 1.0×105 bits/s and 
1.2×106 bits/s for the two paths with total transmission losses of 4 dB and 7.5 dB. 
• A method of using the classical equalization technique in CVQKD detection was 
proposed and implemented, for the first time, to mitigate the inter-symbol-interference that 
occurs in a BHD with limited bandwidth and hence enables detection on higher speed CVQKD 
data with a lower detector bandwidth.  
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Chapter 2  Review of practical PTP QKD links   
2.1 Introduction   
From a hardware point of view, a practical PTP QKD system consists of three basic 
components: a photon source, a channel and a detector. Lasers, after regarded as the most 
practical photon sources, have been widely employed in QKD links [14]. For single photon 
DVQKD generation, the output of a laser is highly attenuated, and coherent optical pulses 
generated from a weakly modulated laser are used in CVQKD links. There are two main types 
of physical channel for optical quantum keys:  free space and optical fibre. Taking account of 
the existing global fibre network and the maturity and performance of advanced optical fibre 
communication systems and devices [70], this thesis mainly focuses on single-mode fibre 
(SMF)-based QKD links and systems. In this review, the detection technique is also discussed 
in detail, as this is another major difference between practical DV and CV QKD links. For the 
DV protocol, photon counting techniques must be used to detect the key information encoded 
in single photons. On the other hand, CVQKD employs coherent detection to distil the key 
from quadrature values of the coherent laser pulses.  
In practical implementation, optical fibre-based quantum key transmission has been carried out 
based on different schemes. The focus of this section therefore is to review the main 
experimental configurations for the point-to-point distribution of quantum keys using DV and 
CV protocols. The corresponding secret key analysis under the presence of Eve is also 
introduced, this being an important measure used in evaluating the practical performance of a 
QKD link.  
2.2 Practical DV QKD links      
2.2.1 Photon source and single photon detector 
In DV QKD, qubits are carried by single photon pulses which are commonly generated by a 
highly attenuated laser. Specifically, as shown in Figure 2.1, optical pulses generated from a 
directly modulated laser (or a laser followed by an amplitude modulator) are attenuated to an 
average power of less than one photon per pulse.  
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Figure 2.1 Scheme for the single photon source based on a pulsed laser. AM: amplitude 
modulator; ATT: Optical attenuator   
The number of photons in each emitting laser pulse follows a Poisson distribution, which can 
be expressed in Eq. (2.1) [14, 71]: 
𝑝(𝑘, 𝜇) = 𝑒−𝜇
𝜇𝑘
𝑘!
 (2.1) 
where  𝜇 is the mean number of photons per pulse and 𝑘 is the actual number of photons in a 
pulse. In Figure 2.2, the photon distributions according to Eq. (2.1) are visualised for a mean 
photon number 𝜇 of 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, and 0.4, respectively. As shown, there is a lower probability 
of having multiple photons present in a single pulse when using a lower value of 𝜇. Therefore, 
the issue of Eve’s PNS attacks on multi-photon pulses can be mitigated in a QKD link by 
further reducing the intensity of the signal pulses. However, having a lower value of 𝜇 also 
gives a limited possibility of single photon pulses. This will decrease the yield of raw keys as 
well as the maximum transmission distance due to the inevitable loss in the channel. As 
discussed in Section 1.2.1, this problem can be efficiently solved in practice by the use of decoy 
states, which are added into the optical pulse train by randomly modulating the power of some 
of the emitted pulses.  
 
 
AM ATT
CW
Laser
single photon
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Figure 2.2 Photon distribution in optical pulses with mean photon number of a) 0.1, b) 0.2, 
c) 0.3, and d) 0.4 
At the receiver end, Bob uses single photon detectors (SPDs) to detect the single photons sent 
from Alice. The most often used SPDs in DVQKD systems uses InGaAs/InP Avalanche 
Photodiodes (APDs), which are able to detect photons with wavelengths from about 950 to 
1650 nm [14]. APD-based SPDs normally work in Geiger mode, in which a reverse bias voltage 
higher than the breakdown voltage is applied on a APD so that a significant avalanche effect 
can be triggered by an electron hole pair created by a single incident photon. To avoid the 
damage to the APD by the huge current, a quenching circuit is necessary to reset the APD 
operation repeatedly by pulling down the bias voltage to below the breakdown voltage. Gated-
mode quenching is commonly used in DVQKD detections, in which the applied bias DC 
voltage is set to be slightly lower than the breakdown voltage so that the APD does not detect 
single photons. At the arrival time of each photon pulse from Alice, Bob increases the bias 
voltage above the breakdown voltage of the APD for a short time window so that the avalanche 
effect is then triggered periodically [5]. The maximum repetition rate of a gated Geiger mode 
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InGaAs/InP APD is typically limited to tens of MHz, although GHz rates  have been 
demonstrated by using techniques such as self-differencing circuits [72] and the sine wave 
gating method [18, 19, 73]. 
In general, the main parameters used to characterise SPDs in DVQKD links are [1, 5, 18]:  
• Quantum detection efficiency: the probability of a detection event when a photon is incident. 
This efficiency is desired to be as high as possible.  
• Background noise counts: including Dark counts and Afterpulses. A Darkcount is the 
background noise generated in the SPD without an incoming photon being present. This 
current is caused by carriers created by a thermal or tunnelling process. Afterpulses cause 
wrong photon counts induced by previous photon detections. This is fundamentally due to 
trapped carriers, created by previous avalanches [1]. Background noise counts are 
unwanted detection events, which lead to an increased QBER [18]. 
• Dead time:  the recovery time for an APD to be reset after a detection. During this period, 
the APD is unable to detect photons. Dead time limits the detection rate. However, the 
carriers trapped in defect states reduce in number exponentially with time [74]. Therefore, 
the dead time needs to be optimised with regards to the trade-off between minimal 
afterpulses and a maximised count rate [75].  
2.2.2 Practical implementation 
As discussed in Section 1.2.1, in the original BB84 QKD proposal, the qubits are encoded in 
the polarisation of single photons. A typical QKD schematic based on a polarisation encoding 
scheme is shown in Figure 2.3 [12, 76].  For Alice, four laser sources are used to generate 
photon pulses polarised in four states (i.e. horizontal, vertical, -45, +45). The optical paths are 
combined using optical couplers onto a single fibre, and each of the lasers is triggered 
correspondingly to generate different polarisation states. Alternatively, state selection can be 
implemented by optical switching with the lasers kept on all the time. The modulated photon 
pulses are then attenuated to the single photon level by an optical attenuator before being sent 
to Bob via optical fibre. At this stage, decoy states can be added by giving some of the pulses 
lower average power. At Bob, a polarisation controller is normally used to compensate for 
polarisation rotation in the optical fibre. The photon pulses are then split or switched to two 
different paths for detections in rectangular and diagonal bases, and each base corresponds to 
two SPDs to represent ‘1’and ‘0’, respectively [12, 76].  
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Figure 2.3 Typical implementation configuration of polarisation-based DVQKD. BS: beam 
splitter, OS: optical switch, ATT: optical variable attenuator, CPC: compensating polarisation 
controller, PBS: polarisation beam splitter, PC: polarisation controller (45o rotation), D1 and 
D0: SPDs [12, 76] 
Alternatively, BB84 based DVQKD can be also used in phase encoding schemes. The idea of 
encoding qubits into the phases of single photons was proposed in 1992 [77].  The practical 
implementation is based on phase modulation/demodulation using a Mach-Zehnder 
interferometer (MZI). The two most common configurations are the double MZI 
implementation and the so-called “plug-and-play” implementation. In a double MZI 
configuration, Alice and Bob each have an MZI installed, as shown in Figure 2.4(a) [76, 78]. 
Optical pulses from a laser are sent through an MZI, and Alice applies a phase shift ϕA to one 
arm using a phase modulator (PM) and an optical delay in the other arm. The power of the two 
consecutive pulses is then attenuated to the desired level and sent to Bob via the optical fibre 
link. Bob uses another MZI. A phase shift ϕB is applied to one of the paths, and the same delay 
line is used for the other path. For each pulse generated from the laser, three peaks will be 
detected at different times. The first peak and the third peak correspond to travel of the photons 
through the PMs and delay lines of the MZIs, respectively. The centre peak is due to the 
photons that successively travel through the PM in Alice and the delay line in Bob, or 
successively travel through the delay line in Alice and the PM in Bob [1]. Therefore, the key 
can be distilled from the central peak due to the interference between phase modulations 
applied by Alice and Bob. Specifically, Alice controls the phase modulator and encodes bits 0 
and 1 in the phase shifts ϕA of 0 and π (first basis) or 1/2π and 3/2π (second basis). To detect 
the bit values, Bob applies a phase shift of 0 to the arrival photons for the first basis and a phase 
shift of 1/2π for the second basis [18, 76, 78].  
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Figure 2.4 Typical implementation configuration of phase-based DVQKD. a) double MZI 
configuration. b) plug-and-play configuration. PM: phase modulator, DL: optical delay line, 
CM: classical monitor, C: circulator, FM: Faraday mirror [1, 76, 78] 
Phase encoding QKD can be also implemented in a “plug-and-play” configuration [79], in 
which both the laser source and detector are put in the same physical location. As shown in 
Figure 2.4(b) [1], each laser pulse is split into two half pulses, P1 and P2, which travel through 
the upper and lower arms of the MZI, respectively. As P1 takes a longer optical path than P2, 
P1 experiences a short delay with respect to P2 at the output of Bob. Since P1 and P2 are 
combined in the polarisation beam splitter (PBS), their polarisations are orthogonal to each 
other.  The PM at Bob remains inactive at this stage. The pulses are then sent to Alice via an 
optical fibre and split by a BS. The BS normally has an uneven coupling ratio (e.g. a coupling 
ratio of 90/10) with the purpose of passing a large fraction of photons to a classical monitor, 
which is used as a synchronizing signal. The rest of the photons successively travel through an 
attenuator, delay line and a phase modulator, and are reflected by an Faraday mirror (FM) 
which returns light with a 90o rotation of polarisation. Alice only applies phase modulation to 
P2 to encode her random bit value on it. Due to the presence of the FM, P1 and P2 are reflected 
back and their polarisations are orthogonally shifted. An attenuator is again used to reduce the 
photon number to the desired level. The delay line is used to avoid Rayleigh backscattering in 
the reflected quantum signal from Alice due to the strong pulse received from Bob. When the 
pulses travel back to Bob and arrive at the PBS, P1 now is routed to the lower path and P2 to 
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the upper path as their polarisations are orthogonal to the original orientations.  In order to 
decode the bit value, Bob applies his phase modulation to P2 as his basis selection. P1 and P2 
are then combined and interfered at BS, and the bit values can be detected by the corresponding 
SPD [1].  
 
Figure 2.5 Schematic of the practical implementation of COW DVQKD. RNG: random number 
generator, AMP: electrical amplifier, AM: amplitude modulator, MI: monitoring 
interferometer [80] 
Last but not least, DVQKD can also be  implemented using the COW protocol with a simpler 
practical setup [25, 80], this being currently used in the commercialized QKD system of 
id Quantique. The conceptual schematic of its implementation is illustrated in Figure 2.5 [80]. 
Alice modulates a continuous wave laser using an amplified random number generator, 
resulting in coherent laser pulses with desired time shifts. The pulses are then attenuated to the 
single photon level for secure transmission. This approach can be regarded as a time encoding 
scheme. Each bit value is encoded into a two-pulse sample with an empty pulse and a full pulse. 
For example, bit 1 is carried by an empty pulse followed by a non-empty pulse, while bit 0 is 
encoded in the other way around. In addition, decoy states are randomly added into the pulse 
train as two successive full pulses to increase the security. At Bob’s site, the received pulses 
are split into a signal path and a monitoring path by an asymmetric BS with a splitting ratio of 
tB:(1-tB), where tB is close to 1. Bit values are detected as the arrival time of the photons at D1 
following the signal path. The detection of decoy states at D1 is random and is discarded after 
Alice announces their time slots at the end of transmission. The coherence between any two 
adjacent pulses is checked by Dm1 and Dm2, together with an asymmetrical interferometer to 
monitor eavesdropping. This is practical thanks to the coherence of the laser, as any two 
successive non-empty pulses (i.e. either two pulses within a decoy state or a bit sequence of 
1-0) would interfere at the interferometer and will always trigger the same monitoring detector 
Dm1. Detection in Dm2 indicates possible attacks by Eve. After transmitting all the bits, Alice 
AM ATT
RNG
MI
bit 0 bit 1 decoy
Alice Bob
CW
Laser
AMP
BS
Dm2
D1
Dm1
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and Bob can estimate the extent of information accessed by Eve by evaluating the visibility of 
the interferometer for two successive non-empty pulses. The visibility is defined as [25]: 
𝑉 =
𝑝(𝐷𝑚1) − 𝑝(𝐷𝑚2)
𝑝(𝐷𝑚1) + 𝑝(𝐷𝑚2)
 
 (2.2) 
where p(D) is the probability of a detection event at the corresponding detector. The lower the 
value of V, the more information can be accessed by Eve [25, 53, 80].                                                                                                                                                               
2.2.3 Secret key analysis and modelling    
The performance of any practical QKD system is evaluated in terms of the QBER and the 
secure key rate varying with transmission distance. In general, the lower bound of the secure 
fraction of transmitted information is given as the common information between Alice and Bob 
minus the minimum Eve’s information from either Alice or Bob [14]: 
𝑟 = 𝐼(𝐴: 𝐵) − min (𝐼𝐸𝐴, 𝐼𝐸𝐵) (2.3) 
In a standard BB84 QKD system and assuming a truly single photon source, 𝐼(𝐴: 𝐵) = 1 −
𝐻2(𝑄𝐵𝐸𝑅)  and min(𝐼𝐸𝐴, 𝐼𝐸𝐵) = 𝑓𝑒𝑐𝐻2(𝑄𝐵𝐸𝑅) [81]. 𝐻2(𝑥) is the binary Shannon entropy 
function: 𝐻2(𝑥) = −𝑥 log2(𝑥) − (1 − 𝑥) log2(1 − 𝑥) . 𝑓𝑒𝑐  corresponds to the efficiency of 
error correction. Therefore, the secure key rate in the unit of bits per pulse can be expressed as 
[14, 82]: 
𝑆 = 𝑞𝑄{1 − 𝐻2(𝐸) − 𝑓𝑒𝑐𝐻2(𝐸)}  (2.4) 
where 𝑞 is the basis reconciliation factor which depends on the protocol implementation, 𝑞 =
0.5 for the standard BB84 protocol because the probability Alice and Bob have compatible 
bases is 50%. Q is the gain of the signal pulse, which indicates the probability of transmission 
of the qubits, and E stands for the QBER.  
In a practical BB84 QKD link, highly attenuated laser pulses are used instead of truly single 
photon sources. The secure key is only distilled from single photon pulses. Thus, Eq. (2.4) is 
modified to be [23, 83]:  
𝑆 = 𝑞{𝑄1[1 − 𝐻2(𝑒1)] − 𝑄𝜇𝑓𝑒𝑐𝐻2(𝐸𝜇)} (2.5) 
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where 𝑄1 and 𝑒1 are the gain and error rate for the single photon states, while 𝑄𝜇 and 𝐸𝜇 are 
the total gain and QBER, respectively. The Q and E are explained in detail as follows.  Firstly, 
the gain of n-photon pulses 𝑄𝑛 is defined as: 
𝑄𝑛 = 𝑌𝑛𝑝(𝑛, 𝜇) = 𝑌𝑛
𝜇𝑛
𝑛!
𝑒−𝜇 (2.6) 
where 𝑝(𝑛, 𝜇) is the Poisson distribution given in Eq. (2.1). The first term 𝑌𝑛 is defined as the 
probability of a detection event on Bob's side given that Alice sends out an n-photon pulse [83], 
which is a function of the background noise counts 𝑌0 (e.g. dark counts) and the transmittance 
of the n-photon state 𝜂𝑛:  
𝑌𝑛 = 𝑌0 + 𝜂𝑛 − 𝑌0𝜂𝑛  ≅ 𝑌0 + 𝜂𝑛 (2.7) 
𝜂𝑛=1 − (1 − 𝜂)
𝑛  (2.8) 
where 𝜂 is the transmittance of the whole link, taking into account losses inside Bob and the 
transmission of the fibre link t . Thus, the total gain of photons  𝑄𝜇 can be expressed as the sum 
of all the possibilities [83]: 
𝑄𝜇 = ∑𝑌𝑛
𝜇𝑛
𝑛!
𝑒−𝜇
∞
𝑛=0
= 𝑌0 + 1 − 𝑒
−𝜂𝜇 (2.9) 
Then, let us investigate the photon number dependent QBER generated in the link. The error 
rate of the n-photon pulse 𝑒𝑛 is defined as [83]:  
𝑒𝑛 =
𝑒0𝑌0 + 𝑒𝑑𝜂𝑛
𝑌𝑛
 (2.10) 
where 𝑒0is the error rate from a vacuum pulse, which is 50% assuming that the output due to 
the background is random, and  𝑒𝑑 denotes the probability of wrong detection (i.e. a photon is 
detected by the non-corresponding detector).  Then the total QBER is then expressed as [83]:  
𝐸𝜇 =
∑ 𝑒𝑛𝑌𝑛
𝜇𝑛
𝑛! 𝑒
−𝜇∞
𝑛=0
𝑄𝜇
=
𝑒0𝑌0
𝑄𝜇
+
𝑒𝑑(1 − 𝑒
−𝜂𝜇)
𝑄𝜇
 (2.11) 
The first term in the above equation is the contribution from the dark count and other 
background noise, which increases with distance.  The second term can be considered to be 
independent of the distance, as the background noise rate is relatively small (of the order of 
10-6).  It is normally used to evaluate a QKD optical setup [1].   
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In a BB84 link without decoy states, Eve can block out single photon pulses and make the 
channel transparent to multi-photon pulses. Therefore, to estimate the worst-case secure key 
rate, the following two conditions must be assumed.  
1. All multi-photon pulses are detected by Bob and all losses are from the pulses containing 
only one photon. Thus, the lower bound for the gain of single photon pulses 𝑄1 can be 
estimated as [84]:  
𝑄1 = 𝑄𝜇 −∑
𝜇𝑛
𝑛!
𝑒−𝜇
∞
𝑛=2
 (2.12) 
The second term of the above equation stands for the probability of sending multi-photon 
pulses from Alice.  When a truly single photon source is assumed, this term is equal to zero. 
2. All the error (i.e. QBER) is assumed to be caused by single photon pulses, while multi-
photon pulses do not cause any error. Thus, the upper bound for error rate from the single 
photon states 𝑒1 is given by [84]:  
𝑒1 =
𝐸𝜇𝑄𝜇
𝑄1
 (2.13) 
Now, the performance in terms of key generation of the standard BB84 DVQKD can be 
evaluated by substituting Q and E in to Eq. (2.5). For practical cases using Poisson sources, 
the performance of QKD links depends largely on the mean photon number. When a higher 
value of 𝜇 is set, secure key generation is limited to a very short distance. This is due to the 
higher probability of having more than one photon in a transmitting pulse.  On the other hand, 
when 𝜇 is very small, the QKD link has a lower gain of single photon pulses 𝑄1 and hence 
worse performance. Therefore, the mean photon number of sending pulses 𝜇  needs to be 
optimised for maximum secure key generation, by making a trade-off between having a lower 
probability of multiphoton pulses from a practical laser source and getting a higher value for 
𝑄1. 
Figure 2.6 shows the secure key rates as a function of transmission distance, calculated for an 
example BB84 QKD link with an ideal truly single photon source and a practical Poisson 
source (a highly attenuated laser) with different levels of 𝜇 (the mean photon number). The 
system parameters used in the calculations are shown in the caption of Figure 2.6, which is 
from one of the state-of-the-art experimental demonstrations of a QKD link [85] .  
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Figure 2.6 The calculated secure bit rate as a function of transmission distance for the standard 
BB84 QKD system using a Poisson or an ideal single photon source. (The error correction 
efficiency fec is assumed to be 1.1, the system error 𝑒𝑑 is fixed at 2.3%, the background noise 
is assumed to be 6.8x10-6, the channel loss coefficient is set as 0.2 dB km-1, and Bob’s detection 
efficiency is fixed at 5% [85]) 
It can be seen from Figure 2.6, that all curves dramatically drop at a maximum transmission 
distance beyond which Eve is able to access more information than that shared between Alice 
and Bob. With a Poisson source, the maximum secure key transmission distance is first 
increased as 𝜇  increases, due to the increased gain of the photons according to Eq. (2.9). 
However, when 𝜇 is further increased, the probability of having multiple photons in a single 
pulse rises, increasing the possibility of PNS attacks. Therefore, the secure key can be only 
shared within a short range. Overall, compared to the case with an ideal single photon source, 
the performance of a practical Poissonian source is much worse due to the presence of 
multiphoton pulses.  
Fortunately, the security of BB84 can be enhanced by adding decoy states. In the simplest 
decoy protocol, a set of decoy pulses also from a highly attenuated laser source but with mean 
photon number 𝑣 (𝑣 < 𝜇) are randomly interleaved into the signal pulse trains. The values of  
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𝜇 and 𝑣 are decided by Alice, which normally needs to be optimised to maximise the secure 
key rate [83]. Using a similar approach to that for 𝑄𝜇 and 𝐸𝜇 for the signal pulses, the gain 
𝑄𝑣 and QBER 𝐸𝑣 for decoy states are given by [83]:  
𝑄𝑣 = ∑𝑌𝑛
𝑣𝑛
𝑛!
𝑒−𝑣
∞
𝑛=0
 (2.14) 
𝐸𝑣 =
∑ 𝑒𝑛𝑌𝑛
𝑣𝑛
𝑛! 𝑒
−𝑣∞
𝑛=0
𝑄𝑣
 (2.15) 
Due to the presence of decoy states , the lower bound of single photon gain 𝑄1 becomes [71, 
83]:  
𝑄1
𝐿 =
𝜇2𝑒−𝜇
𝜇𝑣 − 𝑣2
(𝑄𝑣𝑒
𝑣 − 𝑄𝜇𝑒
𝜇
𝑣2
𝜇2
− 𝐸𝜇𝑄𝜇𝑒
𝜇
𝜇2 − 𝑣2
1
2 𝜇
2
) (2.16) 
By assuming that all errors are in single photon states, the upper bound of the error rate for 
states 𝑒1
𝑈 is written as [71, 83]:  
𝑒1
𝑈 =
𝐸𝜇𝑄𝜇
𝑄1
𝐿  (2.17) 
Substituting the updated 𝑄1 and 𝑒1 to Eq. (2.5), the improved secure key rate can be obtained. 
Normally, in an advanced decoy-state BB84 protocol, two sets of decoy states with different 
intensities 𝑣1 and 𝑣2 are generated by Alice along with the signal pulses. In this case, the lower 
bound for the gain of single photon states 𝑄1  and the upper bound for the QBER for single 𝑒1 
photon states can be estimated as [85]: 
𝑄1
𝐿 =
𝜇2𝑒−𝜇
𝜇𝑣1 − 𝜇𝑣2 − 𝑣1
2 + 𝑣2
2 (𝑄𝑣1𝑒
𝑣1 − 𝑄𝑣2𝑒
𝑣2 −
𝑣1
2 − 𝑣2
2
𝜇2
(𝑄𝜇𝑒
𝜇 − 𝑌0
𝐿)) 
 (2.18) 
𝑒1
𝑈 =
𝐸𝜇𝑄𝜇𝑒
𝜇 −
1
2𝑌0
𝐿
𝑄1
𝐿𝑒𝜇
 (2.19) 
Similarly, secure key rates at different transmission distances can be then evaluated by 
substituting the updated 𝑄1 and 𝑒1 to Eq. (2.5).  
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In a DVQKD link using the COW protocol, the secure key rate equation is also derived from 
Eq. (2.3) as follows [80]:  
𝑆 = 𝑞𝑓𝑄{1 − 𝐻2(𝐸) − 𝐼𝐸} (2.20) 
where, Q and E can be calculated using Eq. (2.9) and Eq. (2.11). Unlike the BB84 protocol, in 
which the quantum signal is generated and gathered pulse by pulse, Eve’s information 𝐼𝐸 in the 
COW is derived differently [25, 80]: 
𝐼𝐸 = 𝜇(1 − 𝑡) + (1 − 𝑉)
1 + 𝑒−𝜇𝑡
2𝑒−𝜇𝑡
 
(2.21) 
where, 𝑉 is the visibility of the monitoring interferometer given in Eq. (2.2). 
In Figure 2.7, we estimate the secure key rate as a function of transmission distance for a BB84 
QKD link with and without decoy states as well as using the COW protocol. The system 
parameters are kept as the same as in Figure 2.6 [85].  
 
Figure 2.7 The simulated secure bit rate as a function of transmission distance for the QKD 
links using BB84 and COW protocols. (For decoy state BB84, the mean photon numbers for 
signal and decoy states from [85] are 𝜇 = 0.55 𝑣1 = 0.1 and 𝑣2 = 7.6 × 10
−4, respectively. 
The calculation for COW protocol uses typical value of 𝜇 = 0.5 and V = 0.9 [25]) 
The plot clearly shows that introducing decoy states to the BB84 protocol not only extends the 
maximum key transmission distance but also significantly improves the secure bit rate. With 
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decoy states, the maximum transmission distance of a BB84 QKD link is extended from less 
than 27 km to 109 km in this example simulation. The calculated secure key rates are also 
greatly improved by the addition of decoy states. In addition, a QKD link using the COW 
protocol under the same systemic parameters offers a similar performance using the security 
analysis approach given in [80].  
2.3 Practical CV QKD links      
2.3.1 Coherent detection   
The most distinctive difference between the practical implementations of DVQKD and 
CVQKD is the detection techniques employed. Unlike the single-photon transmission in 
DVQKD, CVQKD is based on modulating and measuring the quadrature values of 
electromagnetic fields. Therefore, the detection of qubits is conducted using coherent detection: 
a balanced homodyne detector (BHD) (or balanced heterodyne detector which is composed of 
two BHDs) rather than SPDs. The schemes can be illustrated in Figure 2.8.   
 
Figure 2.8 schematics of (a) the balanced homodyne and (b) the heterodyne detection [86] 
As introduced before, in GMCS CVQKD, Alice modulates quadratures x and p of each 
coherent laser pulse and sends them to Bob. When the optical signal pulse train arrives at Bob’s 
BHD, it is superimposed on strong synchronous reference light known as local oscillator (LO), 
at a balanced beam splitter. LO is also normally pulsed in real implementations, as it is 
practically generated from the same source as the signal and time-multiplexed with signal 
pulses during the transmission, as shown in the next Section. By expressing the signal quantum 
states and LO using annihilation operators ?̂?𝑆 and ?̂?𝐿𝑂, the outputs from the beam splitter are 
given by [3, 86]:  
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      ?̂?1,2 =
1
√2
(?̂?𝑆 ± ?̂?𝐿𝑂)  (2.22) 
They are then detected by PIN diodes, and the photocurrents can be represented by photon 
number operators ?̂?1 = ?̂?1
†?̂?1  and ?̂?2 = ?̂?2
†?̂?2 , where ?̂? 
†  (creation operator) represents the 
adjoint of the operator ?̂?. The output of the BHD is finally obtained by subtracting these two 
photocurrents  [3, 86]:  
  = ?̂?2 − ?̂?1 = ?̂?𝑆
†?̂?𝐿𝑂 + ?̂?𝐿𝑂
† ?̂?𝑆 = |𝐿|(?̂?𝑆
†𝑒𝑖𝜃 + ?̂?𝑆𝑒
−𝑖𝜃)               (2.23) 
where |𝐿| and 𝜃 are the amplitude and relative phase of the LO. Since the signal states can be 
decomposed into quadrature components as:  
?̂?𝑆 =
1
√2
(?̂?𝑋 + 𝑗?̂?𝑃)  and ?̂?𝑆
† =
1
√2
(?̂?𝑋 − 𝑗?̂?𝑃)   (2.24) 
   can be expressed using quadrature operators ?̂?𝑋 and ?̂?𝑃 [87]: 
  = √2|𝐿|{?̂?𝑋cos (𝜃) + ?̂?𝑃sin (𝜃)}              (2.25) 
The term inside the bracket indicates the phase-dependent quadrature quantities of the detected 
signal states. Therefore, the value of the signal quadratures x or p which are projected onto the 
field of the LO can be determined by Bob by modulating the relative phase 𝜃 of the LO to 0 or 
π/2. For the case of heterodyne detection, as shown in Figure 2.8(b), the signal is split into two 
BHDs and Bob can simultaneously measure both quadratures x and p by applying a phase shift 
of π/2 to the signal path of only one BHD.  
In a practical GMCS CVQKD link, after Bob records the correlated quadrature values of the 
incoming states |𝛼⟩ = |𝑋𝐴 + 𝑖𝑃𝐴⟩ sent from Alice, two parameters need to be estimated which 
are used for later secure key distillation: the overall channel transmission T, and the excess 
noise ξ (due to device imperfections or the action of an eavesdropper).  Parameter estimation 
can be done through the following equations [39]:  
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑋𝐴) = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑃𝐴) = 𝑉𝐴             (2.26) 
〈𝑋𝐴𝑋𝐵〉 = 〈𝑃𝐴𝑃𝐵〉 = √𝜂𝐵𝑇𝑉𝐴             (2.27) 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑋𝐵) = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑃𝐵) = 𝜂𝐵𝑇𝑉𝐴 +  0 + 𝜂𝐵𝑇𝜉 +  𝑒𝑙𝑒 (2.28) 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑋𝐵0) = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑃𝐵0) =  0 +  𝑒𝑙𝑒 (2.29) 
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where 𝜂𝐵 is the overall transmission efficiency of Bob,  0 is the shot noise variance (vacuum 
noise) which is obtained by presenting the LO alone to BHD, and  𝑒𝑙𝑒 is the electronic noise 
of the BHD. When the parameters T and ξ are determined, Alice and Bob can bound Eve’s 
information and extract the final secure key, as explained in Section 2.3.3.  
In contrast to the APDs employed in DVQKD, the BHD detects the qubits using PIN diodes 
with higher detection efficiency, which offer the promising potential of enabling much higher 
raw key rates in CVQKD. In addition, the BHD used in a CVQKD link is compatible with 
standard telecommunication techniques, which offers better practicability and feasibility in 
integrating with today’s communication networks. However, the common disadvantage of 
BHDs is the noisy measurement of quadratures. The loss experienced by the quantum signal in 
the fibre and additional noise added during the transmission cause a decrease in the signal-to-
noise ratio (SNR) which limits the transmission distance of secure keys [14].   
2.3.2 Practical implementations 
As introduced earlier, in a GMCS CVQKD link, Bob performs coherent detection to measure 
the quadratures of coherent states together with a reference LO, hence obtaining the quantum 
signal. From a practical point of view, the coherent states are prepared by Alice in the form of 
modulated weak pulses from a coherent laser, while the LO can be generated either from the 
same laser by Alice or an independent laser used by Bob. Depending on the location of LO 
generation, the link can be implemented using either the Transmitted Local Oscillator (TLO) 
or Local Local Oscillator (LLO) schemes [88].  
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Figure 2.9 Practical implementation of GMCS CVQKD with TLO [46, 89] 
Most implementations of GMCS CVQKD are based on the TLO approach with a BHD, as 
detailed in Figure 2.9 [45, 46, 89, 90]. In Alice, coherent optical pulses are generated from a 
pulsed laser and split into a weak quantum signal and a bright LO by an asymmetric BS 
(normally with a high splitting ratio of 99/1). In the signal path, the amplitude and phase of the 
pulses are modulated so that the two quadratures x and p follow a Gaussian distribution, using 
an intensity modulator and a phase modulator, respectively. A delay line is used to set the delay 
between the signal path and the LO path, which is normally implemented by an FM and a 
length of fibre. The power of the signal pulses is then controlled by an optical attenuator so 
that the quadratures have the desired variance. The LO and signal are multiplexed at a PBS in 
both polarisation and time and sent to Bob through the same fibre channel, so that crosstalk 
from the LO to the weak signal is greatly reduced. In addition, during propagation, the quantum 
signal and LO experience the same phase drift. Therefore, a stable phase difference between 
them can be maintained. This is the major advantage of a TLO scheme. On Bob’s side, a 
polarisation controller is first used to compensate for the change of polarisation in the fibre link. 
The signal and LO are then polarisation-demultiplexed by a PBS into two optical paths which 
are connected to a BHD. In order to match the arrival time of signal pulses at the input of the 
homodyne detector, the same length of delay line is applied to the LO path. From the output of 
the BHD, Bob can obtain the value of either the x or p quadrature by randomly applying a π/2 
or 0 phase shift to the LO pulses with the help of a PM [46, 89]. The GMCS CVQKD with 
TLO can be also implemented using heterodyne detection, in which case Bob is able to measure 
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both the quadratures of each signal pulse without a phase modulator. However, the additional 
BS introduces a 3dB loss to the signal which in turn reduces the key rate. 
 
Figure 2.10 Practical implementation of GMCS CVQKD with LLO. [91-93] 
A typical implementation of a GMCS CVQKD system based on the LLO scheme has been 
reported in [91-93] which avoids the need for multiplexing the LO and signal as well as the 
transmission of the LO from Alice to Bob. A schematic of the setup is shown in Figure 2.10. 
Similar to the signal path in a TLO design, coherent states in the form of Gaussian modulated 
optical pulses are prepared by Alice and sent to Bob via fibre link. Another set of pulses with 
a fixed phase and amplitudes, which are known as the “phase reference”, are generated by 
Alice in different time bins and transmitted along with the signal. The amplitude of phase 
reference pulses is set to be much higher than the signal. Bob uses the two BHDs (i.e. 
heterodyne detection) to measure both quadratures of the signal and phase reference pulses. 
The phase information from the measured reference pulses is then used to correct the phase 
change of the signal during transmission. Specifically, as the LO is generated by a second free-
running laser which is locally located with Bob, the quadrature measurements have a reference 
frame which is misaligned from the frame used by Alice by a phase difference θd, as shown in 
Figure 2.11 [92]. By publicly announcing the phase information (or quadrature values) of the 
reference pulses, the estimated phase angle θd  is applied to rotate and remap Alice’s or Bob’s 
state quadrature values.  
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Figure 2.11 a) Illustration of the misalignment between Alice’s and Bob’s phase reference 
frames. The same signal states would give Alice and Bob different quadratures. b) corrected 
state based on the phase value of the reference state [92] 
From the perspective of practical implementation, both TLO and LLO designs have their 
advantages and disadvantages.  In a TLO design, the main benefit is that a constant phase 
difference between the signal and LO is promised during the transmission. This is because the 
LO and signal are generated from the same source and propagate through the same fibre 
channel, where they experience equivalent phase noise. However, for a given LO laser located 
at Alice, the power of the received LO pulses is reduced over longer transmission distances, 
and it is not able to meet the requirement for coherent detection by Bob [88]. There is also a 
practical challenge to providing significant power output from Alice’s laser. 
On the other hand, although LLO-based CVQKD also has those problems, the main challenge 
is to practically keep a stable relative phase between the signal and LO [88]. Practically, the 
rotated signal states using reference pulses are still not truly corrected due to the effect of 
linewidth of the two individual lasers, which causes unstable drift between the reference frames 
of Alice and Bob. This inevitably introduces extra phase noise during the key transmission of 
the LLO based CVQKD link, which will be further discussed in the secret key analysis in the 
next section.  
2.3.3 Secret key analysis and modelling    
As in the case of DVQKD, the performance of CVQKD links is evaluated using the secure key 
rate as a function of transmission distance. The calculation of secure keys in this thesis is based 
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on the commonly used approach given in [94] and [95], with reverse reconciliation [96]. In the 
following, the same formulas can be applied to both TLO and LLO based CVQKD, except that 
the LLO scheme introduces additional excess noise contributed by phase drifting, as shown 
later in this section. First of all, the formula for the final secure key information between Alice 
and Bob is given by [14]:   
𝑟 = 𝛽𝐼𝐴𝐵 − 𝜒𝐵𝐸 (2.30) 
where IAB is the mutual information shared between Alice and Bob, β is the reconciliation 
efficiency, and χBE is the maximum information accessible to Eve limited by the Holevo 
bound [97]. Using Shannon’s equation , IAB can be derived as [94]:  
𝐼𝐴𝐵 =
1
2
𝜅 𝑙𝑜𝑔2
𝑉 + 𝜒𝑡𝑜𝑡
1 + 𝜒𝑡𝑜𝑡
 (2.31) 
where κ = 1 in the case of homodyne detection and κ = 2 in case of heterodyne detection. V is 
defined as = 𝑉𝐴 + 1 , where 𝑉𝐴 is Alice’s modulation variance. 𝜒𝑡𝑜𝑡 is the total noise added 
during the transmission, and is normally referred to as the channel input (i.e. at Alice).  It 
includes both the noise added in the channel 𝜒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 (contributed from both channel loss and 
excess noise) and the homodyne/heterodyne detection noise 𝜒ℎ, and can be expressed using 
Eq. (2.32)–(2.34). All the parameters here are implicitly expressed in the shot noise unit (SNU) 
N0 , which is the vacuum noise fluctuation.  
 𝜒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 =
1
𝑇
− 1 + 𝜉 (2.32) 
 𝜒ℎ𝑜𝑚 =
[(1−𝜂𝐵)+𝑉𝑒𝑙𝑒]
𝜂𝐵
  or  𝜒ℎ𝑒𝑡 =
[1+(1−𝜂𝐵)+2𝑉𝑒𝑙𝑒]
𝜂𝐵
 (2.33) 
 𝜒𝑡𝑜𝑡 = 𝜒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 +
𝜒ℎ
𝑇
 (2.34) 
where 𝜂𝐵 is the overall transmission efficiency of Bob, 𝑉𝑒𝑙𝑒 is the variance in output due to the 
detector’s electronic noise, and T and ξ are the aforementioned transmission and excess noise 
featured by the channel, which can be experimentally estimated from Bob’s measurement using 
Eq. (2.26)–(2.29). Theoretically, ξ is assumed to have originated from eavesdropping. But, in 
practice, ξ can be contributed to by a range of experimental imperfections, such as relative 
intensity noise (RIN) noise, modulation noise, quantisation noise and phase noise. A full range 
of noise sources can be found in [98].  Here, the phase noise estimation is discussed which is 
the only term that differs in the secure key calculation in LLO and TLO based implementations.  
34 
 
Firstly, the relative phase 𝜑𝑠 between signal and LO can be written as: 
𝜑𝑠 = 𝜃𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑂 − 𝜃𝑆𝑆𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒  (2.35) 
In general, the phase noise 𝑉𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒 is the variance of the difference between the estimated and 
actual relative phase 𝜑𝑠, which can be expressed as [88]: 
𝑉𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒 = 𝑉𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ + 𝑉𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑙 + 𝑉𝑒𝑠𝑡 (2.36) 
The first term 𝑉𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ corresponds to the variance due to the relative phase drift between two 
free running lasers in the LLO scheme, which can be estimated using their spectral linewidths 
ΔvA and ΔvB [88]: 
𝑉𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ = 2𝜋
Δ𝑣𝐴 + Δ𝑣𝐵
𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑝
 (2.37) 
This represents the major contribution to phase noise in LLO implementations, because it is 
impractical to have an extremely low linewidth laser. Increasing the repetition rate would also 
pose other practical challenges related to the noise performance, which will be also discussed 
in Chapter 5.  
The second term 𝑉𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑙 is due to the relative phase 𝜑𝑠 changes during propagation in the 
optical fibre. In an LLO scheme, as the transmitting reference pulses used for phase correction 
follow exactly the same optical paths as the signal pulses, this effect will not contribute to the 
phase noise 𝑉𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑙 = 0 [88]. In a TLO scheme, the signal pulses and LO pulses propagate 
through different optical paths inside Alice and Bob, as shown in Figure 2.9. Practically, this 
effect can be mitigated by periodically sending pilot pulses along with the signal pulses, and 
similar phase estimation to that in an LLO can be applied.  
The third term 𝑉𝑒𝑠𝑡 indicates the estimation efficiency, which is the variance of the difference 
between the phase of the sending reference pulse and the estimated phase of reference pulse on 
reception in the LLO scheme. Similarly, this noise term applies to the pilot pulses in the TLO 
scheme. This term is inversely proportional to the amplitude of the reference/pilot pulse as [92]: 
𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟  = 𝑣𝑎𝑟(?̂?𝑅/𝑃 − 𝜑𝑅/𝑃) =
(𝜒𝑡𝑜𝑡 + 1)
𝐸𝑅/𝑃
2  (2.38) 
Therefore, the difference between the phase noise estimation of LLO and TLO schemes can be 
seen as:  
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𝑉𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒_𝑇𝐿𝑂 = 𝑉𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑙 + 𝑉𝑒𝑠𝑡 (2.39) 
𝑉𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒_𝐿𝐿𝑂 = 𝑉𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ + 𝑉𝑒𝑠𝑡 (2.40) 
The corresponding contribution to excess noise is given by [91]:  
𝜉𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒 = 2𝑉𝐴(1 − 𝑒
−𝑉𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒/2) ≈ 𝑉𝐴 × 𝑉𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒 (2.41) 
Practically, as the term 𝑉𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ normally dominates other contributions in the phase noise 
estimation, the phase noise 𝜉𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒 in the LLO scheme. Hence the total excess noise 𝜉, is higher 
than that of TLO scheme [88].  
Next, let us evaluate the maximum bound of Eve’s information regarding Bob’s key, which is 
bounded as [91, 95]: 
𝜒𝐵𝐸 = ∑𝐺 (
𝜆𝑖 − 1
2
) − ∑𝐺 (
𝜆𝑖 − 1
2
)  
5
𝑖=3
 
2
𝑖=1
 
(2.42) 
where 𝐺(𝑥) = (𝑥 + 1) 𝑙𝑜𝑔2(𝑥 + 1) − 𝑥𝑙𝑜𝑔2𝑥 :  
λ1,2 = √
1
2
(𝐴 ± √𝐴2 − 4𝐵)   (2.43) 
with: 
𝐴 = 𝑉2(1 − 2𝑇) + 2𝑇 + 𝑇2(𝑉 + 𝜒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒)
2 (2.44) 
𝐵 = [𝑇(𝑉𝜒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 + 1)]
2 (2.45) 
The second term of 𝜒𝐵𝐸 , λ3,4 is given by: 
λ3,4 = √
1
2
(𝐶 ± √𝐶2 − 4𝐷) and λ5 = 1 (2.46) 
where C and D are expressed differently for homodyne detection and heterodyne detection. For 
the case of a single BHD:  
𝐶ℎ𝑜𝑚 =
𝐴𝜒ℎ𝑜𝑚 + 𝑉√𝐵 + 𝑇(𝑉 + 𝜒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒)
𝑇(𝑉 + 𝜒𝑡𝑜𝑡)
 (2.47) 
𝐷ℎ𝑜𝑚 = √𝐵
𝑉 + √𝐵𝜒ℎ𝑜𝑚
𝑇(𝑉 + 𝜒𝑡𝑜𝑡)
 (2.48) 
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For the case of heterodyne detection: 
𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑡 =
[𝐴𝜒ℎ𝑒𝑡
2 + 𝐵 + 1 + 2𝜒ℎ𝑒𝑡 (𝑉√𝐵 +  𝑇(𝑉 + 𝜒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒)) + 2𝑇(𝑉
2 − 1)]
(𝑇(𝑉 + 𝜒𝑡𝑜𝑡))
2  (2.49) 
𝐷ℎ𝑒𝑡 = (
𝑉 + √𝐵𝜒ℎ𝑒𝑡
𝑇(𝑉 + 𝜒𝑡𝑜𝑡)
)
2
 (2.50) 
As a comparison, the secure key rate at different transmission distances is estimated and plotted 
in Figure 2.12 for an example GMCS CVQKD link with the different implementation methods 
introduced in Section 2.3.2. The phase noise in the LLO scheme is estimated by assuming that 
the linewidth of the lasers is 50 kHz and that there is a state of art system clock rate of 
50 MHz [47].  
 
Figure 2.12 The calculated secure key rates for TLO and LLO- based CVQKD with 
homodyne(hom)/heterodyne(het) detection (electronic noise 𝑉𝑒𝑙𝑒 is fixed at 0.01, excess noise 
without phase noise contribution is assumed to be 0.03, the overall transmission efficiency of 
Bob ηB is set to 0.5, and VA is assumed to be 10. All the systematic parameters are expressed 
in SNU)  
Figure 2.12 shows that the CVQKD links with TLO have better performance compared with 
LLO. This is because the phase noise is enhanced due to the phase drift between Alice’s and 
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Bob’s lasers, which in turn increases the total excess noise. Therefore, Eve has more freedom 
to manipulate the transmitting keys, and hence reduces the secure key information shared 
between Alice and Bob. In addition, the use of heterodyne detection offers higher secure key 
rate over a shorter distance, because the measurements taken of both quadratures of the 
received states doubles the mutual information shared between Alice and Bob. However, the 
information accessible to Eve increases faster with distance for the case of heterodyne detection, 
and starts to dominate. As a result, both secure key rates over long-distance transmission and 
maximum transmission distance for heterodyne detection are surpassed by a single BHD.  For 
a LLO based CVQKD link, only heterodyne detection can be employed, as the phase of each 
reference pulse needs to be determined from the simultaneous measurement of the two 
quadratures.  
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2.4 State of the art QKD performance      
The previously demonstrated experimental implementation of state-of-art fibre-based PTP 
QKD links with the different protocols and configurations discussed in this chapter are 
summarised and plotted in Figure 2.13. For a fair comparison, the secure key rate is plotted as 
a function of channel loss instead of distance, as the optical fibre loss (in dB/km) varies in these 
demonstrations.   
 
Figure 2.13 State-of-the-art performance of practically implemented QKD PTP links, using 
the BB84+decoy protocol with phase encoding scheme [44, 85] and polarisation encoding 
scheme [99, 100], COW protocol [29, 101] ,  and GMCS CVQKD with TLO scheme [46, 47] 
and LLO scheme [102, 103]. (*** The secure key results for GMCS CVQKD with LLO scheme 
are not experimentally measured but predicted from estimated system parameters.) 
A Mbit/s secure key rate for DVQKD was first reported by A. R. Dixon et al. with a phase 
encoded QKD link using the BB84 protocol with decoy states at a 20 km transmission distance 
(with a channel loss of about 4 dB) [85].  In addition, 10.1 kbit/s was achieved in their 
experiment when the transmission distance is increased to 100 km, which is still being able to 
mark the state-of-the-art performance of a fibre-based PTP QKD link. Later, L. C. Comandar 
et al. improved the secure key rate to 1.26 Mbit/s at 50 km (with 10.1 dB loss) with an enhanced 
InGaAs avalanche photodiode integrated with the self-differencing circuit [44]. Polarisation 
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encoded DVQKD links using the BB84 protocol with decoy states have also been demonstrated 
with Mbit/s secure key rate with 9.2 dB transmission loss [100] and about 40 dB transmission 
loss with a secure key rate of 23 bit/s [99]. The implementation of DVQKD using the COW 
protocol by B. Korzh et al. achieved the longest QKD transmission distance of 307 km (with 
51.9 dB loss) with a secure key rate of 3.18 bit/s [29]. 
The state-of-the-art practical demonstrations of GMCS CVQKD is based on the TLO scheme 
in terms of secure key rate (1 Mbit/s at 5 dB transmission loss) [47] and maximum transmission 
distance/loss (20 dB loss with ~0.5 kbit/s secure key rate) [46] were both reported by D. 
Huang et al.. The GMCS CVQKD with LLO is a much younger design and has been recently 
proposed and investigated [91]. Although there has not yet been a practical system 
demonstrated that can generate final secure keys using the LLO scheme, the latest experiments 
have demonstrated the feasibility of a Mbit/s secure key rate at a transmission loss of less than 
10 dB [102, 103].  
2.5 Summary      
This Chapter reviews the common approaches of fibre-based QKD point-to-point 
implementations with both DV and CV protocols. For DVQKD links, the practical photon 
source and single photon detection technologies are discussed. The practically used highly 
attenuated laser (i.e. Poisson source) for single photon generation poses a security issue for 
PNS attack, which can be efficiently solved by the simple use of decoy states. APD based SPD 
are widely used in DVQKD links, of which the main characteristics are introduced. The two 
most common implementation configurations, polarisation and phase encoding schemes, are 
reviewed in detail for practical fibre-based QKD links. The most commonly used secret key 
analysis for DVQKD links is provided, based on which the problem of using a practical Poisson 
source and the improved performance offered by decoy states are illustrated in terms of secure 
key rate simulations. State-of-the-art experiments have achieved a Mbit/s secure key rate within 
a range of 50 km [44], and over hundreds of kilometres of optical fibre with a 3.18 bit/s secure 
key rate [29].  
In CVQKD, instead of using single photon technologies, key information is carried by the 
quadrature values of electromagnetic fields. The coherent detection used for quadrature 
measurement in CVQKD links uses a BHD or heterodyne detector (composed of two 
conjugated BHDs). The LO required for coherent detection can be practically implemented 
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based on either TLO or LLO design, depending on whether the LO laser is sent from Alice or 
locally located with Bob’s. With widely used secret key analysis, the secure key rate is 
simulated for CVQKD links in both TLO and LLO configurations. From a practical point of 
view, a GMCS CVQKD link demonstration with the TLO design has achieved a 1 Mbit/s 
secure key rate over 25 km of optical fibre [47]. In addition, the maximum transmission 
distance has been extended to 100 km [46]. A complete LLO-based CVQKD system is still 
under development, but the feasibility of a Mbit/s secure key rate at a transmission loss less 
than 10 dB has been demonstrated [102, 103].  
The QKD links introduced and investigated so far only operate point-to-point connections 
between two users. With the final goal of applying QKD in the today’s networks, secure keys 
need to be distributed between multiple users instead of a single pair of Alice and Bob [26]. 
Different QKD networking structures have been proposed and studied over the last decade, 
which will be introduced in the next chapter. Among those approaches, optical switching has 
been shown to be a promising technology for the realization of reconfigurable multi-user QKD 
networks. 
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Chapter 3  Optically switched QKD systems   
3.1 Introduction   
The QKD links introduced and studied in the previous chapters operate in the configuration of 
a point-to-point connection between two parties. Several techniques such as passive splitting, 
trusted repeating, and optical switching have been investigated for the purpose of extending 
the scope of key distribution to multiple users and to provide secure communications over 
existing telecommunication networks. This section begins with a detailed review of these three 
topologies, and the pros and cons of each are illustrated. Among them, optical switching has 
been shown to be a promising method for the cost-effective realization of multi-user QKD 
systems.  
Following this review of past work, different optical switching techniques are studied, and the 
important parameters for the evaluation of optical switch performance are introduced. 
Although the practical application of optical switching with large data capacity using 
conventional telecommunications is still under development due to the limited scalability and 
switching time of optical switches, optically switched quantum key distribution would be 
feasible. As weak quantum signals are very sensitive to loss and noise [68], the insertion loss 
and crosstalk introduced by an optical switch affects the quantum key transmission between 
each pair of users.  
In this chapter, the feasibility and issues of using optical switching in QKD are 
comprehensively analysed and discussed. Specifically, a mathematical model describing an 
optically switched QKD system is constructed by modifying the conventional secure key 
analysis to include additional crosstalk and loss. Based on this, the performance of optically 
switched QKD systems can be theoretically evaluated in terms of QBER and secure key rate. 
The impact of switch crosstalk and loss on QKD transmission is practically investigated via a 
series of proof-of-concept experiments, amply demonstrating the feasibility of optically 
switched QKD system. The experimental results are also verified by the mathematical model.  
This chapter focuses on the introduction of optical switches and the examination of their effect 
on a reconfigurable QKD system. Given that all current demonstrations on multiuser systems 
use DVQKD devices, the protocol used here is the basic BB84 DVQKD protocol. 
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3.2 Review of multiuser QKD systems  
3.2.1 Passive splitting scenario  
Multiuser QKD systems using passive beam splitters (BS) have been implemented by many 
research groups [49-52] since the first demonstration by Townsend et al. [48]. Representative 
example setups are illustrated in Figure 3.1 [51]. An optical connection between a single 
terminal and multiple terminals is implemented by the use of a 1×N passive splitter. The key 
distribution can be conducted in either an upstream or a downstream configuration. In  
conventional cases, implementation normally employs a downstream configuration. The 
sending quantum signal from Alice is routed to a different path and forwarded to different Bobs. 
Such a scenario enables simultaneous secure key distribution from one user to multiple users. 
However, this configuration suffers from three practical problems: firstly, each Bob needs to 
have at least one single photon detector installed, which leads to higher cost. Secondly, the 
bandwidth of each detector is not sufficiently used, as most of the time each detector is not 
activated. Thirdly, the splitter cannot deterministically direct the photon to each Bob, as the 
photon at each time slot will be randomly routed to one of the N paths of the splitter [49, 51]. 
A further multi-user QKD system is based on an upstream configuration, in which the splitter 
works as a combiner, and the quantum signal from multiple Alices are combined into a single 
link connected to a common Bob [51]. Time-division multiplexing (TDM) techniques are 
employed, in which the quantum signals for different destinations are allocated to specific time 
slots and the detector in Bob detects only one photon from each Alice at each time slot. In this 
configuration, only one detector is required, which significantly reduces the overall cost of the 
system.  
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Figure 3.1 Schematic of passive-splitting multi-user QKD systems based on a) downstream 
and b) upstream configurations [51] 
Although multiuser QKD systems based on this type of upstream passive splitting have benefits 
of low network complexity and low cost, the weaknesses are obvious. The main challenge is 
the reduced scalability due to the increasing transmission loss when involving more end 
users [104] . For example, a three-node key distribution requires a 1×2 passive optical splitter 
which gives 3 dB of additional loss in the transmission. However, a 17-node system would 
experience a 12 dB loss from the passive optical splitter. As discussed previously, the secure 
key rate dramatically decreases with increasing transmission distances due to increasing fibre 
loss. A 12 dB additional loss can be predicted to reduce the maximum transmission distance 
by 60 km, assuming an attenuation coefficient of 0.2 dB/km at 1550 nm. In addition, the 
connections within this networking scenario cannot be dynamically selected on demand.  
3.2.2 Trusted repeating scenario 
The use of trusted repeating is another method for implementing multiuser QKD systems with 
less network complexity and respectable scalability. A typical structure is composed of a group 
of fixed PTP QKD links, as shown in Figure 3.2. Each user is located at a secure place and 
equipped with a classical memory gathering the key from others. Every two adjacent QKD 
users are connected by a unique link with a pair of Alice and Bobs, and the secure key can be 
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then distributed between them. For users that are not directly connected (e.g. User 2 and User 3), 
the key can be retransmitted via one intermediate user or a few intermediate users (i.e. User 1 
or User 4).  
 
Figure 3.2 Schematic of a typical trusted repeating multi-user QKD systems 
Specifically, the intermediate user acts as a trusted ‘repeater’, which respectively shares the 
individual keys with the users on each transmitting or receiving side. As shown in Figure 3.3, 
the two keys are combined using the OTP method, guaranteeing the security [59, 105]. The 
resulting final key is sent to the receiving end user, which can be converted back to a private 
key shared with the source user. Therefore, this type of multiuser system can be easily extended 
over longer distances or scaled to large areas as a chain of QKD links by such a ‘hop-by-hop’ 
mechanism [106]. Representative multiuser QKD systems based on this topology have been 
demonstrated in [53, 54]. Theoretically, the transmission distance of this type of system can 
extended as far as desired, if all the intermediate nodes are guaranteed to be secure and trusted. 
The other benefit is that each link can employ different types of QKD systems. For example, 
in the QKD system established by SECOQC [53], different protocols, including COW BB84 
GMCS, etc. are employed for different links.  
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Figure 3.3 Secure key sharing scheme with a trusted repeater in QKD links with three users. 
K1 and K2 are the two individual keys shared between the middle trusted repeater and adjacent 
users 
However, in the practical implementation, the privacy of the intermediate users or repeaters 
must be guaranteed [63], otherwise the security of the whole network will be broken. In 
addition, although this topology in principle has the best scalability as it does not introduce 
additional topology’s inherent attenuation, a large-scale multiuser QKD network solely based 
on this scenario is not practical due to the significant cost, as each user needs to be equipped 
with at least one pair of QKD devices.  
3.2.3 Optical path switching scenario 
A third type of multi-user QKD is based on the optical path switching scenario, in which 
transparent end-to-end connections are created and dynamically configured using transparent 
optical switches. The basic schematic is shown in Figure 3.4.  
 
Figure 3.4 Schematic of a typical optically switched multi-user QKD system 
The optical switch connects optical paths (i.e. fibres) to different Alices and Bobs. The routing 
of the paths is normally electronically controlled on demand to perform dynamic 
interconnections between multiusers. The secure key can be shared between any pair of Alice 
and Bob. The earliest optically switched multiuser QKD system was demonstrated by Toliver 
et al. [56], in which a secure key was established between Alice and Bob through different 
types of optical switch elements, such as MEMS, lithium niobate (LiNbO3), and 
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optomechanical switches. Honjo et al. reported a QKD experiment through an 8x8 matrix 
switch which employs the thermo-optic effect in silica glass [57]. Tajima et al. developed an 
optically switched QKD system in which a single Bob was used as a central node and shared 
keys with two remote Alices [58]. Optical switching has since been employed in many QKD 
network field trials (e.g. the DARPA QKD network [59], the three-node QKD network by 
NIST [107], as well as the reconfigurable QKD network in US [61]) [26]. 
Optical switching has lower transmission loss and provides a more flexible path 
reconfiguration compared with the passive splitting scenario. It allows for the selective 
connection of any pair of Alice and Bobs connected to the switch. In addition, Multi-user QKD 
systems based on this topology can be realized with end-to-end optical channels, without 
trusting any node in the middle. The quantum signal will not be interrupted or regenerated by 
any middle point during the transmission. The corresponding cost of building a multi user 
system is also effectively reduced, since fewer QKD devices are involved in the switching 
architecture. Although the common concern is that the optical switching scenario cannot be 
used to extend the QKD transmission distance, this problem can be solved in conjunction with 
a small number of trusted nodes [26, 63].  
3.3 Optical switching techniques  
Optical switching technologies were initially studied for conventional telecommunication 
networks. In today’s networks, data is mainly transmitted in the optical domain but is switched 
by electronic switches, alongside which two processes are used: opto-electronic (OE) and 
electro-optic (EO) conversion. Although such ‘OEO’ electronic switching is a reliable and 
widely employed technique in current commercial systems, it has a limited capacity due to its 
electronic components which poses a problem for future communications system with higher 
data rates. Therefore, optical switching techniques have drawn much research interest, due to 
the absence of signal conversion and hence the capacity limitations on electronic components. 
In addition, the switches also have the benefit of lower energy consumption. The major 
parameters used to evaluate an optical switch are listed below [108] : 
• Switching time: the time spent for setting up new connections within the optical switches. 
Different switching times may be required depending on applications.  
• Insertion loss: the end-to-end transmission loss in the optical path added by the switch, 
including both coupling loss and internal loss. Although the value is desired to be as low 
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as possible, this loss is normally compensated for by optical amplifiers in conventional 
communication systems.  
• Crosstalk: the fraction of the signal intensity in the desired switched path contributed by 
the other source ports rather than the corresponding input. This parameter indicates the 
noise due to the leakage from other source signals.  
• Extinction ratio: the ratio between the power at the signal output port in the ON and OFF 
states. 
• Input power dynamic range (IPDR): The input operating power range with the desired 
minimum bit error ratio (BER) performance. This value indicates the noise introduced by 
the switch itself, and the maximum power limitations due to the distortion. 
• Scalability: the practical number of input/output ports to which a given switch technology 
can be scaled. This is normally restricted by increased insertion loss, crosstalk and signal 
dynamic range in a large-scale switch design.  
There are various optical switching technologies, mainly using one or more of electro-optical, 
thermo-optical, acousto-optical, liquid crystal, semiconductor optical amplifier (SOA), and 
opto-mechanical technologies [109]. The optical switches are basically categorized based on 
the corresponding fundamental physical effects used for triggering the switches. In this section 
these optical switching technologies will be briefly introduced and compared, and their use in 
QKD will be discussed. In a typical electro-optical switch element, the switching of the state 
relies on the electro-optic effect, in which the refractive index of an optical medium can be 
altered by an external electric field. It is normally implemented in an interferometric structure, 
either MZI [110] [111] or a directional coupler [112], as shown in Figure 3.5. In both 
configurations, the electric-optic material, such as Lithium niobate (LiNbO3), is used as a phase 
shifter. The applied voltage induces a change in the refractive index and hence a phase shift in 
the corresponding optical path. Thus, the interference between signals in the two arms would 
be either constructive or destructive (or in-between), and if in either full constructive or 
destructive state, the signal is output to one of the two ports [109]. Electro-optic switches have 
relatively low power consumption and a high switching speed with nanosecond timescale, but 
normally suffer from high insertion loss and crosstalk.  
Similarly, a thermo-optical switch is also realized based on the interferometric configurations 
in Figure 3.5. Instead of relying on the electric-optic effect, the phase change and hence the 
switching function is realized by the change of refractive index via temperature variations [109]. 
Commonly used materials include silica [113], silicon [114], polymer [115], and LiNbO3 [116]. 
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This type of optical switch has moderate loss and crosstalk level, but a lower switching speed 
of the order of milliseconds. In addition, the high-power consumption of the heating process 
limits the scalability to a large switch size [108].  
 
Figure 3.5 Schematic of an interferometric switching element using a a) MZI or b) 
directional coupler [108, 117] 
In an acousto-optic switch, as the name suggests, the switching function is conducted based on 
the acousto-optic effect. When acoustic waves propagate along the surface of an acoustic 
material, the consequent mechanical strains induce changes in the refractive index. Such 
changes lead to a diffraction grating in the material, which alters the polarisation state of the 
optical signal propagating through it [109]. The structure of a basic switching element is shown 
in Figure 3.6 [117]. The 2x2 polarisation beam splitter splits the incoming optical signal into 
two paths with horizontal and vertical components, respectively. The acousto-optic material is 
normally LiNbO3 [118]. Without an applied acoustic wave, the split orthogonal optical signal 
recombines at another 2x2 polarisation beam splitter and is output from one of the ports. When 
an acoustic wave is applied in the same direction as the signal, the polarisation is rotated. Thus, 
the output signal can be routed from one port to another. Although an acousto-optic switch 
normally has a faster switching speed of around a microsecond timescale, the scalability of 
such a technique is restricted by its relatively high loss and crosstalk [108].  
Coupler Coupler
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Figure 3.6 Scheme of a basic acousto-optic switching element [117] 
Liquid crystal (LC) switches use the change of polarisation of an incoming signal related to the 
orientation of molecules within LC cells. The principle of a basic switching element is shown 
in Figure 3.7. The input signal is polarised and travels through an LC cell, which works as a 
voltage controlled polarisation rotator. Application of an electric field causes a change in 
orientation of the LC cell and hence induces a rotation of polarisation in the passing signals. 
Then the signal is routed at the polarisation combiner and output from one of the output ports. 
This type of switch has moderate loss and crosstalk, and has a switching time in the range of 
microseconds and milliseconds [109, 117].  
 
Figure 3.7 Scheme of a basic liquid crystal switching element [117] 
SOA-based optical switches use SOAs as gating elements. For an optical signal travelling 
through an SOA element, a biased SOA element produces desirable optical gain, while an 
inactive SOA introduces a significant amount of loss. The switching principle of a basic 1x2 
SOA-based optical switch is illustrated in Figure 3.8. The input signal is split into two paths 
by a beam splitter, and the SOA in each path is used as a gating element. The signal in the 
desired path is amplified by a biased SOA element, while the signal in the other path is ‘blocked’ 
by turning off the electrical bias current to the corresponding SOA element [108, 109].  
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Figure 3.8 Scheme of a basic SOA based switching element 
SOA based switches have many advantages, such as a fast switching time of nanosecond 
timescales, low insertion loss, and high extinction ratio. However, the scalability of SOA based 
switches is limited by the amplified spontaneous emission (ASE) noise [119]. The ASE also 
makes this type of switch not applicable to QKD, as the weak quantum signal is very sensitive 
to noise. Their high power consumption due to the injected bias current to SOA elements is 
another disadvantage. 
Opto-mechanical switches were the first commercialized optical switching technology, and are 
still the most practically used in conventional communications. Generally speaking, the idea is 
based on physically moving free-space optical elements, including mirrors, prisms, and 
shutters [117]. Two examples of an opto-mechanical switching element based on the motion 
of a mirror are illustrated in Figure 3.9, in which the switching function is performed by rotating 
or moving the mirror between inputs and outputs, respectively. For building large scale optical 
switches, MEMS technology is usually employed in the fabrication of smaller and integrated 
switching elements. Opto-mechanical switches have been attractive for practical purposes as 
they have low insertion loss and low crosstalk level as well as low cost. The response time 
ranges from microseconds to milliseconds, making them not suitable for fast switching 
applications [108].  
BS
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Figure 3.9 Schematic of a basic Opto-Mechanical switching element. 
Regardless of different switching technologies, large scale NxN optical switches are practically 
realized by cascading the basic 1x2 or 2x2 switching elements as building blocks [117]. 
Therefore, this section also introduces the typical switch architectures that enable large-scale 
optical switch designs:  Tree, Benes, Crossbar and Clos [120]. A tree architecture is illustrated 
in Figure 3.10(a). It consists of a number of splitters/combiners at the input/output. The splitters 
and combiners can be either passive couplers or active switching elements [120, 121]. The 
major disadvantage of this architecture is that the number of splitters/combiners increases with 
the size of the switch, which in turn results in a significant path loss in the large-scale design. 
Crossbar architecture, as indicated in Figure 3.10(b), is a square matrix with rows as inputs and 
columns as outputs, or vice-versa. N2 basic switching elements are required for an N×N 
crossbar switch. Hence, in a large-scale switch design, a huge number of switching elements 
are required. The other problem of this architecture is that the insertion loss and propagation 
time can be different for different paths. This would introduce imbalanced performance 
between paths [108]. In Clos architecture, a large-scale switch is integrated from smaller switch 
blocks. As shown in Figure 3.10(c), an NxN Clos architecture has three stages. Let r×n=N, the 
first stage has r switches of size n×m, the middle stage has m switches of size r×r, and the last 
stage has r  m×n switches [120]. Benes architecture can be seen as a special form of Clos 
architecture. As shown in Figure 3.10(d), each of the first stage and the third stage have N/2 
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2x2 switches, and the middle stage consists of two rxr Benes switches. Compared to other 
architectures, the Benes architecture requires a minimum number of switching elements as well 
as offering the lowest insertion loss [120] .   
 
Figure 3.10 Schematics of (a) Tree (b) Crossbar (c) Clos and (d) Benes switch 
architectures [120] 
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Although optical switches have become the focus of much research with their maturing 
fabrication techniques, their practical use in current classical communication systems is still 
challenged by their limited scalability and switching time to handle today’s large data capacity. 
However, optical switching technologies show great potential for use in QKD systems. In 
switched QKD systems, the use of optical-electrical-optical (OEO) switches is not practical, as 
each port of the switch must perform the optical to electrical conversion, which involves key 
detection and hence a significant number of QKD devices. To use optical switching techniques, 
the weak quantum signals are very sensitive to loss and noise [68]. Any optical switch used in 
routing quantum signals will more or less degrade the secure bit rate of each user. Thus, optical 
switches used in QKD systems need to be carefully designed to introduce minimal loss and 
crosstalk. SOA based switches cannot be used in this case, as they intrinsically introduce ASE 
noise which severely impairs the weak quantum signals. The following sections in this Chapter 
focus on the investigation of QKD performance in terms of the secure key rate under additional 
loss and crosstalk.  
Table 3.1 summarizes representative experimental demonstrations of QKD transmission via 
optical switches. In reference [56], the quantum signal is transmitted through 10km of fibre 
followed by a switch element between one Alice and one Bob. The loss of the MEMs switch 
is not particularly mentioned, but the total path losses at the four switch outputs range from 
between 5.5 and 5.9 dB.   
Crosstalk is not explicitly mentioned in most of those experiments. This is because no 
spontaneous QKD signal from two or more Alice-Bob pairs has been tested through the 
switches in previous experimental demonstrations, which have focused on point- to-point or 
point-to-multi-point transmissions through optical switches. However, the crosstalk effect 
should not be overlooked as it introduces additional noise photons to the desired path and hence 
degrades the QKD performance. This is considered and discussed in the theoretical model and 
experimental demonstration presented in the flowing sections of this chapter.  
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Table 3.1 Representative experimental demonstrations of optically switched QKD 
transmission (Crosstalk is not explicitly mentioned in most of those experiments） 
Reference Switch 
technique 
Switch 
size 
Loss Crosstalk No. of users in 
experiment 
Toliver [56] MEMS 4x4 N/A N/A Two 
Toliver [56] LiNbO3 2x2 5.4 dB N/A Two 
Honjo [57] Thermal- 
optical 
8x8 5.7 dB -42.4 dB Three 
Chapuran [61] MEMS 4x4 2.1dB N/A Two 
Chen [63] Opto-
mechanical 
8 ports 0.9-1.2dB N/A Five 
Ma [122] MEMS 2x4 1.5-1.8dB N/A Four 
3.4 Evaluation of optically switched QKD systems 
The commonly used mathematical model of a back-to-back QKD transmission has been 
introduced in Chapter 2, showing how the QBER and secure key rate can be estimated for a 
point-to-point link with an Alice and Bob. Here, the back-to-back model is modified for the 
purpose of evaluating switched QKD systems as shown in Figure 3.4. The optical switch in the 
middle can be characterised as introducing additional noise and loss that occurs in the key 
transmission path.  
When the QKD signal is transmitted through an optical switch, a fraction of the signal power 
is lost due to both coupling loss and internal switch loss. Therefore, the transmittance of the 
each QKD link through optical switch becomes:  
𝜂 = 𝜂𝐵10
−
𝛼𝑙+𝐿𝑠
10  (3.1) 
where 𝐿𝑠 is the total loss due to the optical switch (in dB). 𝜂𝐵 is the transmittance of Bob’s 
setup. 𝛼 and 𝑙  are the attenuation coefficient (in dB/km) and the length (in km) of the fibre 
link, respectively.   
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In addition, because of crosstalk effects within the optical switches, QKD signals transmitted 
along other paths through the switch add in a noise part 𝑐𝑛 to the yield 𝑌𝑛 of an n-photon state 
(defined in Eq. (2.7)) of the desired transmission path, because of the switch crosstalk: 
𝑌𝑛 = 𝑌0 + 𝜂𝑛 + 𝑐𝑛 (3.2) 
where 𝑐𝑛 is sourced from other QKD inputs to the optical switch, which can be defined in the 
same way as 𝜂𝑛 in Eq. (2.8): 
𝑐𝑛 = 1 − (1 − 𝑐)
𝑛 (3.3) 
𝑐 = 𝜂10−
𝐶𝑇
10  (3.4) 
where CT is the value of switch crosstalk in dB. 
Therefore, the overall gain in signal states and decoy states through the desired transmission 
path can be described as:  
𝑄𝜇 = ∑𝑌𝑛
𝜇𝑛
𝑛!
𝑒−𝜇
∞
𝑛=0
= 𝑌0 + 1 − 𝑒
−𝜂𝜇 + 1 − 𝑒−𝑐𝜇 (3.5) 
𝑄𝑣 = ∑𝑌𝑛
𝑣𝑛
𝑛!
𝑒−𝑣
∞
𝑛=0
= 𝑌0 + 1 − 𝑒
−𝜂𝑣 + 1 − 𝑒−𝑐𝑣 (3.6) 
and the overall QBER in signal states is rewritten as:  
𝐸𝜇 =
∑ 𝑒𝑖𝑌𝑛
𝜇𝑛
𝑛! 𝑒
−𝜇∞
𝑛=0
𝑄𝜇
=
𝑒0𝑌0 + 𝑒𝑑(1 − 𝑒
−𝜂𝜇) + 𝑒0(1 − 𝑒
−𝑐𝜇)
𝑄𝜇
 (3.7) 
The lower bound for the gain of single photon states 𝑄1
𝐿 and the upper bound for the QBER for 
single 𝑒1
𝑈 photon states can be then obtained using Eq. (2.16) and Eq. (2.17) for the desired 
transmission path. Substituting 𝑄1
𝐿 and 𝑒1
𝑈 into the secure key rate equations, we can calculate 
the secure bit rate of the QKD transmission through an optical switch with loss 𝐿𝑠 and crosstalk 
value CT. Based on our mathematical model, the performance of an optically switched QKD 
system can be theoretically evaluated.  
In order to show the performance degradation induced by an optical switch and hence study 
the feasibility of an optically switched QKD system, the mathematical model has been used to 
simulate an example QKD transmission system using a decoy-state BB84 protocol and a 
practical 8x8 Benes MZI electro-optical switch [123]. The QKD system parameters are the 
same as those used in the calculations in Chapter 2 from [85], which are listed in the caption 
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of Figure 3.11. The optical switch has an insertion loss of 6.52 dB and a crosstalk level 
of -19.57 dB [123]. With the back-to-back performance as a reference, the estimated QBER 
and corresponding secure key rate is plotted in Figure 3.11 as a function of transmission 
distance. The extra loss and crosstalk introduced in this 8x8 MZI optical switch inevitably 
degrades the performance of the QKD system. The minimum QBER at zero distance rises from 
2.3% to 2.9%. At a moderate 50km transmission distance, eg.in a metropolitan area, the QBER 
is increased from 2.5% to 3.8%. In this case, the maximum secure key transmission distance 
drops from about 109 km to 72 km with such a switch and the maximum secure key rate at 
50 km is significantly degraded from 3.1×10-4 to 3.7×10-5 bit/pulse.  
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Figure 3.11 a) The simulated QBER as a function of transmission distance of the decoy state 
QKD with and without optical switch. b) The simulated secure bit rate as a function of 
transmission distance of decoy state QKD with and without optical switch. (The optimised 
mean photon numbers for signal and decoy states are 𝜇 = 0.55 𝑣1 = 0.1 and 𝑣2 = 7.6 × 10
−4, 
The error correction efficiency fec is assumed to be 1.1, the system error 𝑒𝑑 is fixed at 2.3%, 
the background noise is assumed to be 6.8x10-6, the channel loss coefficient is set as 0.2 dB/km, 
and Bob’s detection efficiency is fixed at 5% [85]) 
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Applying the mathematical model to more general cases, the optically switched QKD system 
performance degradation has also been investigated for different levels of additional losse and 
crosstalk due to an optical switch. The simulated results are presented in Figure 3.12 and 
Figure 3.13, respectively. Figure 3.12(a) shows that the QBER increases with additional losses 
as more quantum signals vanish during transmission. At a transmission distance of 50 km, the 
QBER doubles when a 12 dB loss is added into the channel. On the other hand, the maximum 
transmission distance decreases from 104.2 km to 89.2 km, 74.2 km, 59.2 km, and 44.2 km 
with an optical switch with loss of 3 dB, 6 dB, 9 dB, and 12 dB, respectively, if a level of 
QBER of 5% needs to be guaranteed. The corresponding secure key rates are plotted in 
Figure 3.12(b). Firstly, the key transmission distance is significantly reduced by the additional 
losses. If an optical switch introduces a 3 dB loss to the QKD transmission path, the maximum 
transmission distance is shortened by 15 km assuming an attenuation coefficient of 0.2 dB/km 
at 1550 nm in SSMF. The transmission distance would be further reduced to about 79.5 km, 
64.5 km, or 49.5 km with 6 dB, 9 dB, or 12 dB additional loss introduced by an optical switch. 
Then, at a fibre distance of 50 km, secure key rate drops from 3.1×10-4 to 1.4×10-4, 6.1×10-5, 
1.9×10-5 and Null bit/pulse with an optical switch with an insertion loss of 3 dB, 6 dB, 9 dB 
and 12 dB, respectively. Given that an optical amplifier cannot be used during the quantum 
signal transmission, the optical switch need to be selected to introduce as little insertion loss as 
possible to realize a scalable QKD network.  
The QBER and secure key rates have also been simulated with different levels of crosstalk. 
Figure 3.13(a) shows that values of crosstalk less than -25 dB would not introduce significant 
errors into the received quantum signal. For a crosstalk level worse than -25 dB, the QBER 
raises sharply at a short transmission distance. At 50 km, the QBER rises from 2.5% to 4.0% 
and 6.8% with a crosstalk level of -15 dB and -10 dB, respectively. Over a longer distance, as 
both the signal from the desired port and the interference from other source ports of the optical 
switch are both significantly reduced by the high channel loss, the crosstalk effect therefore 
has less dominance on the QBER. This is the reason why the QBER curves for different 
crosstalk levels converge with increasing transmission distance. The secure key rate has been 
calculated in Figure 3.13(b). No secure key can be guaranteed with a crosstalk level of -10 dB 
in our simulated case, while crosstalk levels better than -20 dB would not significantly affect 
the secure key rates.  
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Figure 3.12 a) The simulated QBER and b) the simulated secure bit rate as a function of 
transmission distance of the decoy state QKD with different levels of additional losses. 
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Figure 3.13 a) The simulated QBER and b) the simulated secure bit rate as a function of 
transmission distance of the decoy state QKD with different levels of additional crosstalk. 
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3.5 Proof-of-concept experiments 
In order to study practically the feasibility of a basic optically switched multi-user QKD system, 
the performance in term of the QBER of QKD paths through optical switches was investigated 
by a series of proof-of-concept experiments featuring additional emulated switch losses and 
crosstalk from an interferer. The detailed experimental setup of a polarisation encoding QKD 
system based on the BB84 protocol is shown in Figure 3.14.  
 
Figure 3.14 Experimental setup. AM: amplitude modulator; PS: polarisation scrambler; PC: 
polarisation controller; ATT: attenuator; PBS: polarisation beam splitter; SPD: single photon 
detector 
The sender (Alice) generated an optical pulse train from a 1547.72 nm wavelength continuous 
wave laser (laser 1) modulated by an amplitude modulator, which is driven by a 2 MHz 
electrical signal from an arbitrary wave generator. The pulse duration is fixed at 2 ns. The 
optical pulses are then split into two equal loss paths at an optical coupler. The polarisation 
controllers in the two paths are used to encode the photon pulses in one of the four polarisation 
states within two pairs of polarisation bases (i.e. horizontal and vertical using a rectilinear basis, 
and 45° and 135° using a diagonal basis). Horizontal (or 45°) and vertical (or 135°) polarised 
photons represent the logic bit values '0' and '1' respectively. Two amplitude modulators 
operating as on/off gating components are used to select which logical bit is transmitted. An 
optical attenuator is used at the output of Alice and the signal is attenuated to an average level 
of 0.4 photons per pulse.   
In order to investigate the effect of crosstalk within an optical switch, crosstalk photons from 
another quantum path are emulated as randomly polarised photons from an additional highly 
attenuated laser source (laser 2), which has the same wavelength of 1547.72 nm. Specifically, 
the polarisation of crosstalk photons from laser 2 are randomised by a commercial polarisation 
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scrambler (PS), and the different level of crosstalk are tuned by an optical variable attenuator. 
Then, the resulting crosstalk photons are coupled into the desired quantum transmission path 
via an optical coupler. Another variable attenuator is used at the output of the coupler to 
emulate different levels of channel loss for the signal with crosstalk photons.  
In Bob’s setup, a polarisation controller performed the basis selection. In this experiment we 
chose arbitrarily to examine the horizontal and vertical basis. Owing to resource constraints, 
only one time-gated SPD is involved in the experiment. Therefore, the two orthogonal 
polarisations of the incoming signal from Alice are resolved using two polarising beam splitters 
and 50 m of fibre. This enabled the horizontal polarisation to be delayed by 250 ns with respect 
to the vertical polarisation, allowing both polarisations to be detected using one SPD operating 
at a clock rate of 4 MHz, as illustrated in Figure 3.15. Thus, both correct and error detections 
can be measured at different time slots. For example, if the received pulse is initially vertically 
polarised in Alice (ie. encoded as bit ‘1’), the detection of SPD of the first pulse corresponds 
to the correct detection of bit ‘1’, and the detection of the second pulse is the error count which 
is due to the background noise including dark counts and crosstalk photons. A digital data 
acquisition system, consisting of a software controlled digital input/output card installed in a 
computer, is used to record the output from the SPD and calculate QBER from the 
measurements. The overall setup of Bob has a total loss of about 1.5 dB, which come from the 
polarisation controllers, polarising beam splitters and the connectors. 
 
Figure 3.15 Detection of both polarisation using the same SPD 
QBER can be experimentally measured by comparing both 0 s (horizontally polarised) and 1 s 
(vertically polarised) bits between those Alice sent and those Bob received under the condition 
that they are using the same basis. The bits are discarded when the bases of Alice and Bob are 
different during the sifting processing. The experimental results for different levels of crosstalk 
and loss are plotted in Figure 3.16 together with calculated results using our mathematical 
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model introduced in Section 3.4. It can be seen that the estimated QBER (dashed lines) and the 
experimental results (solid symbols) are in excellent agreement. The error bar indicates the 
observed error in the measurement from the SPD. The minimum measured QBER at 0 dB loss 
and without crosstalk is about 2%, and is caused by finite modulation extinction and 
misalignment of the system. This QBER increases to 2.4%, 3.5%, 4.8%, 7.4% and 10.6% for 
an additional 2 dB, 4 dB, 6 dB, 8 dB, and 10 dB channel loss, respectively. Channel loss arises 
from both the fibre link and the optical switch. The addition of an optical switch would shorten 
the maximum transmission distance for a required QBER level. It can be predicted that the use 
of a 2 dB loss optical switch in the channel would reduce the maximum transmission distance 
by 10 km (assuming an attenuation coefficient of 0.2 dB/km at 1550 nm).   
 
Figure 3.16 The measured (solid symbols) and calculated (dashed lines) QBER 
With regard to the crosstalk effect, a crosstalk level of -9 dB, -12 dB, -15 dB and -18 dB 
introduces 4.7%, 2.5%, 0.9%, and 0.6% extra QBER respectively at a channel loss of 4 dB. 
(The 4 dB channel loss can correspond to a 10km transmission if the optical switch has a 2 dB 
loss). As the channel loss increases the received signal becomes dominated by detector noise, 
which has a greater impact than that of crosstalk on the QBER. Thus, the crosstalk does not 
have a large effect on the QBER at higher channel losses. The values of crosstalk better 
than -21 dB do not introduce a significant additional penalty to the QBER performance of the 
QKD system at any transmission distance, as very few crosstalk photons are leaked from the 
other source signals into the desired signal path. This is also predicted by our mathematical 
model.  
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3.6 Summary 
In this chapter, three scenarios of establishing multi user QKD systems have been reviewed. 
These are based on passive splitting, trusted repeating and optical switching. In the system with 
passive splitters, the loss increases with the number of users, which limits the scalability. 
Trusted repeating requires a pair of QKD devices in each of the middle points. Although the 
transmission distance can be easily extended by cascading more repeating nodes, the 
accompanying significant cost makes this scenario impractical. Optical switching is the most 
promising technique in the realization of reconfigurable systems. It offers lower transmission 
loss and higher flexibility compared with the multi user systems based on a passive splitting 
scenario. On the other hand, unlike trusted repeating multi user systems, the use of optical 
switches provides end-to-end key distribution without the need for intermediate trusted nodes. 
It can be used cost-effectively to share secure keys between multiple parties.  
A range of main switching techniques have been introduced and reviewed, and the 
corresponding pros and cons of each one discussed in terms of the important evaluation 
parameters. When using optical switches in a QKD system, the accompanying loss and 
crosstalk level unavoidably affect the transmission of quantum signals. The feasibility and 
issues of optically switched QKD systems have been theoretically studied via a mathematical 
model derived from the general secure key analysis for point to point links, featuring an optical 
switch as having an additional channel loss and crosstalk. Based on this model, the changes in 
QBER and hence secure key rates caused by a practical optical switch have been simulated for 
a typical QKD system. This has been then applied to the general cases with different levels of 
loss and crosstalk that an optical switching element would introduce. The simulation shows 
that loss should be carefully minimised and crosstalk kept below about -20 dB when designing 
or selecting optical switch elements for a reconfigurable QKD system.  
Following that, with a series proof-of-concept experiments, the mathematical model has been 
verified experimentally and the feasibility of the optically switched multi-user QKD system 
has been experimentally studied. The performance in term of QBER has been investigated at 
different levels of losses and crosstalk with a basic QKD setup. As predicted by the 
mathematical model, the experimental result shows that -21 dB of crosstalk introduces a 
negligible penalty, but a -9 dB crosstalk level adds 5% QBER. The increasing channel loss 
introduced by both the optical fibre channel and optical switch significantly affect the QKD 
performance. 
65 
 
Chapter 4  Reconfigurable QKD over Metro 
network 
4.1 Introduction  
As discussed in the previous chapters, a QKD system can achieve secure key transmission over 
hundreds of kilometres of optical fibre link [29], making QKD applicable for encryption in 
metropolitan area networks. As DVQKD has been commercialized by a few companies, the 
technique has reached a mature level, being considered for practical deployment. In addition, 
optical switching has been shown to be a promising method for achieving QKD between 
multiple end users within a flexible network structure. As mentioned previously, optical 
switches are used not only in lab demonstrations [56, 57, 60] but also in a few QKD network 
field trials [59, 61-63]. However, the smooth and cost-effective integration of reconfigurable 
QKD into the current practical metro network still needs further investigation.  
In addition, most previous lab demonstrations of optically switched QKD systems have focused 
only on the system function and performance in terms of QBER and secure key rate at each 
path. The overall system reconfiguration time has not attracted much research attention to date, 
and is either not described in detail or for relatively long (many minutes) in most practical 
network demonstrations in terms of practical transmission loss/distance. For example, in the 
field trial of a practical optically switched QKD system by T.E.Chapuran et al. [61], the QKD 
transmission was switched between a distance of 25 km and 10 km. The system reconfiguration 
times for the two paths were 19 minutes and 7 minutes, respectively. In the most recent 
demonstration, an optically switched QKD was applied to a software defined networking (SDN) 
controlled optical network [62]. The overall system reconfiguration time was greater than 21 
minutes when switching from back-to-back to a 25 km distance. However, for the practical 
integration of QKD in metro networks, this reconfiguration time would significantly limit the 
reconfigurability of the network and reduce the overall quantum key transmission speed 
between users.  
This chapter describes a novel quantum-safe network solution which smoothly integrates a 
reconfigurable QKD with a reduced system reconfiguration time to protect the data traffic in a 
realistic metro network. This solution shows the potential for fast switching quantum channels 
between multiple users and resuming secure key transmission immediately between different 
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Alices and Bobs. The proposed network architecture and operational principle of dynamic key 
sharing are described. A coexistence scheme is employed for the transmission of the classical 
channel and quantum channel, which are placed in different wavelength bands in the same fibre 
infrastructure. Efficient quantum encryption topologies between different end-users are also 
presented. Optimisation of the reconciliation and clock distribution architecture is predicted to 
result in a reduced system/network reconfiguration time.  
Next, by a series of proof-of-concept experiments, the feasibility of a switched multi-node 
QKD system within the proposed network architecture has been demonstrated. The 
experimental setup includes a centralised Bob that exchanges quantum keys with multiple 
virtualised Alices in either TDM or handshake modes. Classical data and control signals in the 
C-band coexist in the same fibre as quantum signals which has a wavelength of 1310 nm. As 
in the current system, the reconfiguration time is not limited by the switch itself, opto-
mechanical switches with millisecond switching times are employed, which have low loss and 
negligible crosstalk. The work presented in this chapter was submitted and accepted by Journal 
of Lightwave Technology in 2018 [26].  
4.2 Reconfigurable quantum-safe metro network  
A conventional metropolitan-scale network architecture may be considered in two parts: the 
access network and the metro network, as shown in Figure 4.1. The metro network 
interconnects a number of metro nodes to span different physical metro areas and provides high 
capacity paths between them. At the periphery of the metro network, edge routers with 
relatively lower traffic capacity transfer data between the metro network and local access 
networks. An optical access network normally uses passive optical networking (PON). The 
data packet transferred within the network includes the header, which gives information of the 
source and destination address in addition to the transmitted information. Both edge and metro 
routers are able to retrieve the Internet Protocol (IP) address from the header of the data packets 
from end users at the inputs and route them to their desired destinations at the outputs, using 
the electrical domain. Therefore, OE conversion is performed at the inputs of each router, and 
EO conversion is performed at the outputs of the routers. By comparison, edge routers receive 
(send) customer data packets from (to) the metro network while metro routers forward the data 
packets between other metro/edge routers within the metro network [124]. 
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Figure 4.1 Schematic of a metro network structure. 
The system proposed in this chapter integrates QKD into the existing metro network as shown 
in Figure 4.2. Within the metro network, a QKD system is installed (including an Alice-Bob 
pair and a QKD server PC) at the physical location of each metro router within a metro node 
(e.g. Metro Node A in Figure 4.2). OEO conversion of the classical signal is conducted at the 
ports of each router. The Alice and Bob sub-systems are connected via an optical switch, which 
enables the reconfiguration of quantum signal routes between different nodes. In order to 
maximise the transmission distance as well as the secure key rate, the optical switch must have 
minimum loss and crosstalk. Pairs of Alice and Bob are all electronically connected and 
controlled by a QKD server PC via an Ethernet switch. Through a switch, the QKD server also 
stores and provides the quantum keys to external encryption devices (e.g. line cards), and 
communicates with its relevant Alice-Bob pairs. The line cards, installed at each port of a metro 
router, are then used for the point-to-point encryption which will be explained in detail later. 
Separately, each end user in an access network has a QKD device. To reduce the overall cost 
of the practical implementation, the device belonging to each end user would be an Alice rather 
than a Bob, as the detection system is usually much expensive than the transmitter in a QKD 
link.  
Metro Router 
Edge Router 
Metro network
Access  network
Edge Router 
Users 
Users 
Access  network
Access  network
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Figure 4.2 The proposed quantum safe metro network architecture 
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Between the metro node and the end users in the access network, there are two options for 
integrating QKD depending on the distance between the edge router and its adjacent metro 
router. Firstly, as illustrated in the edge node scenario 1 in Figure 4.2, if an edge router is 
located physically far away from its metro router, an edge router is integrated with a QKD Bob 
device. A low loss optical switch is also employed within such an edge node to switch the Bob 
device to different Alices in the access or metro nodes. Secondly, if the edge router is at the 
same physical location as a metro router, the edge node includes both an edge router and a 
metro router. This node structure is shown as the edge node (scenario 2) in Figure 4.2, which 
is a combination of the edge node (scenario 1) and metro node A. Thus, this approach removes 
the need for a line card between the edge router and metro router and the need for an extra Bob 
device. Similarly, Alice can send quantum signals to different metro nodes, while Bob can 
detect quantum signals from different end users, or metro nodes, via reconfigurable optical 
switches.  
As has been discussed, it is important to study and enhance the reconfigurability of the QKD 
network which depends greatly on the system reconfiguration time, being the time required to 
produce secure key material when setting up a new connection. Three components normally 
contribute to the overall system reconfiguration time: the speed of the optical switch itself, the 
time taken for initialization of the system, and the final key regeneration time [60].  
The first component corresponds to the time taken for a new connection to be physically set 
up. This depends on the intrinsic switching time of the optical switch. As discussed in Chapter 3, 
different optical switching techniques offer different switching times. Normally, optical 
switches with shorter switching times (in the nanosecond range) have a relatively higher loss 
and crosstalk (as in the case of electro-optic switches), while those with slower speeds (in the 
millisecond range) have lower insertion loss and crosstalk levels (as in the case of opto-
mechanical switches) [125]. This time is relatively short compared to the other two 
contributions and does not represent the major limit on the reconfigurability of the QKD 
network. Therefore, an opto-mechanical switch can be used in this proposed network.  
The second component contributing to the system reconfiguration time is the initialization time 
for a newly connected Alice-Bob pair. This mainly depends on the time needed for the 
alignment of timing information between Alice and Bob, as well as for optimising the system 
parameters. Conventionally, the initialization must be performed every time the optical route 
is switched for a new Alice-Bob pair. This contribution to current practical/commercialized 
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QKD systems can be many minutes and normally dominates the system reconfiguration time. 
In this proposed network, this can be reduced by the broadcast of the clock signal to all 
endpoints from a single source, and the timing and frame information being stored after the 
first connection and later recalled for subsequent connections. The clock signal can be 
produced by a master clock, which can use duplicated optical sources for failover protection. 
This optical clock signal can be distributed with Erbium-Doped Fibre Amplifier (EDFAs) 
placed as necessary to provide split and transmission loss compensation for the clock signal.  
The third component is the time taken to collect enough raw key material (normally a few 
Mbits) to perform the post processing, including error correction and privacy amplification, 
and hence to begin secure key generation for a new connection between a pair of Alice and 
Bob [60, 126]. This time is therefore dependent on the raw data transmission rate and error rate 
which are a function of the channel loss and the presence of interference. A longer transmission 
distance or higher channel loss will result in a longer delay due to this contribution. This time 
delay can be reduced by optimisation of the protocol implementation.  
While secure keys are being established between users in a quantum channel, traditional 
communication encrypted by the keys and the clock broadcasting are meanwhile conducted 
over a classical channel. The post-processing is also carried out using the classical channel. 
Conventionally, since the signal level in the classical channel is much higher (more than 70 dB 
higher) than that of the quantum signal, the two channels are physically isolated in separate 
fibres to avoid impairments to the key transmission by leakage from the classical to the 
quantum channel [127]. However, the installation of additional fibres when integrating QKD 
into the existing network would lead to a high cost. Fortunately, later studies have focused on 
the so called ‘co-existence scheme’ [128-132], using Wavelength Division Multiplexing 
(WDM) technology, as shown in Figure 4.3 [129]. In this scheme, the quantum channel is 
multiplexed with the classical channel using different wavelengths on Alice’s side and 
transmitted over the same fibre, where it is demultiplexed at Bob with the classical data being 
filtered out by the de-multiplexer. Such an idea eliminates the need for additional fibre 
infrastructure [133] and enables the cost-effective integration of optically switched QKD into 
classical networks.  
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Figure 4.3 Schematics for the co-existence scheme of quantum and classical channels. 
Classical channel includes both conventional data transmission and post-processing signals 
for QKD systems. BF: bandpass filter. Att: attenuator. Mux/Demux: multiplexer/de-
multiplexer [129] 
One important problem with this scheme arises from photon leakage of the classical channel 
into the quantum channel, which introduces additional noise to the key transmission. This can 
be mainly caused by insufficient isolation between the wavelength channels in the mux/demux 
as well as the effect of Raman scattering during transmission. Raman scattering is a 
phenomenon in which photons are inelastically scattered through excitation by  photon–phonon 
interactions [128, 134]. The scattered photons have different energies and hence different 
wavelengths from the incident photons. A bandpass filter (BF) can be used at the input of Bob 
to further reduce the passband and then mitigate the photon leakage from the classical channel. 
The launch power of the classical channel can also be reduced to a limit that corresponds to the 
photodetector’s sensitivity [129], as shown in Figure 4.3. Practically, the C-band (in the 
wavelength range of 1530–1565 nm) is widely used nowadays for classical communication, 
taking advantage of the lower optical fibre attenuation coefficient (0.2 dB/km in a standard 
single mode fibre) [69]. In addition, the C-band is approximately the wavelength range within 
which an EDFA is widely deployed. To mitigate the effect of the noise caused from Raman 
scattering, the weak quantum signal of the integrated QKD needs to be allocated spectrally 
away from the classical channel. Therefore, the O-band (around 1310 nm) is often used as the 
quantum channel, though this has a higher  fibre attenuation of 0.3 dB/km in a standard single 
mode fibre [61, 66, 135].  
Based on this coexistence scheme, the quantum, classical and clock signals are all wavelength-
multiplexed together and transmitted using the same optical fibre from node to node/endpoint. 
To suppress the effect of noise photons leaking between the classical channel and the quantum 
channel, the classical signal and the clock signal are allocated in the C-band, while the QKD 
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signals are placed in the O-band. Each Bob has a narrow BF at the input to further mitigate this 
effect.   
To encrypt the data within such a network, the secure keys must first be properly generated and 
distributed. The arrangement of the quantum channel is therefore shown as green lines in 
Figure 4.3. The routing of the quantum signals is transparently reconfigurable due to optical 
switching, and quantum keys can be dynamically established between any two QKD end points 
(Alice/Bob) within the maximum achievable transmission distance of the QKD system. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, the secure key rate of a point to point QKD link dramatically 
decreases with increasing transmission distance, which corresponds to increasing channel loss. 
Although state of the art QKD links have enabled secure key transmission over hundreds of 
kilometres [29], the insertion loss and the crosstalk of the optical switch in use needs to be 
minimised to guarantee a transmission distance with a secure key rate suitable for a 
metropolitan area. The system degradations due to both loss and crosstalk induced by the 
optical switch must be considered in the system design. An optical switch must be carefully 
selected and designed, as discussed in Chapter 3.  
In addition, to further extend the transmission distance, trusted repeating techniques can be 
combined with optically switched QKD networks [63]. By deploying this kind of hybrid 
network, the reconfigurability offered by optical switching complements the network 
scalability offered by trusted repeating. Therefore, QKD connections can be reconfigured 
between different users and cost effectively extended to longer distances. Thus, in the proposed 
network structure, when exchanging keys between two physically distant QKD Alice-Bob pairs, 
the node can also operate as a trusted node (repeater). In this case, the mechanism of key 
sharing is shown in Figure 4.4. Endpoint 1 and Endpoint 2/Node 2 first establish secure keys 
K1 and K2 with the middle trusted node (Node 1), respectively. Then Alice and Bob are 
optically switched in Node 1. As the trusted node knows both K1 and K2, it will then send K1
⊕K2 to Endpoint 2/Node 2 using the classical channel. Endpoint 2/Node 2 thus knows K1 by 
applying K1⊕K2⊕K2 = K1 (where ⊕ is an exclusive OR operation). 
 
Figure 4.4 Mechanism of exchange secure key between two distant QKD hops 
Alice 1
Bob 1 Alice 1
Bob 2 or Alice 2Switch
Endpoint 1 Node 2 or Endpoint 2 Node 1 K 1 K 2
K1⊕K2 K1⊕K2⊕K2 = K1
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The encryption is based on two different topologies in two corresponding steps: “point-to-point” 
(PTP) encryption between adjacent nodes (Layer 1 encryption) and “end-to-end” (ETE) 
encryption between distant end users (Layer 3 encryption). First, ETE encryption uses quantum 
secure keys shared between source and destination end users. At this step, only the payload 
(data section) of the data packets are encrypted and the header is left unencrypted, as the router 
in the edge node needs to be concerned with the destination address when transferring the 
encrypted data. Secondly, the Layer 1 data encryption between network routers uses PTP 
encryption realized by the line cards. Specifically, line cards encrypt/decrypt the full length of 
the passing data packets (both header and data section), which are payload-encrypted data 
packets in the first step, using the quantum secure keys shared between network nodes. 
4.3 Proof-of-concept Experiment    
The feasibility of the dynamic reconfiguration of QKD routing and secure key establishment 
between multiple metro nodes in the proposed network structure has been studied 
experimentally. The commercial Clavis 3 ID Quantique (IDQ) QKD system [136] is employed 
in the experiments, which is based on a COW protocol [25]. Before the introduction of the 
experimental setup, the QKD platform is briefly illustrated as follows [137].  
In Alice, a train of optical pulses is generated by a continuous-wave laser with a wavelength of 
1310 nm modulated by an intensity modulator at 1.25 GHz. The bit values are encoded into the 
pulse train based on the COW protocol, which has been introduced in Chapter 2. Decoy states 
are randomly added into the pulse train to enhance the security. The optical pulses are then 
highly attenuated to the desired intensity level by a variable optical attenuator. This level is 
normally optimised for different transmission distances/losses. The pulses are then sent from 
Alice to Bob over the quantum channel.  
In Bob, using an asymmetric optical coupler, most of the intensity is split out and used to record 
the arrival time of each pulse by an SPD, while the rest of the intensity is sent to the 
interferometer and another SPD to check the phase relation between consecutive pulses and 
hence decode the bit information. The SPD operates in free running mode. To reduce 
afterpulsing and hence the background noise, increased deadtime is applied to the 
detectors [138]. 
In each Alice or Bob device, postprocessing and key distillation are conducted using a field-
programmable gate array (FPGA) module, which is controlled by software installed in a QKD 
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PC via an Ethernet cable. The software also performs automatic initialization, including frame 
and time-slot alignments for the connected Alice-Bob pair before the transmission of the 
quantum signal. After the exchange of raw keys, error correction is conducted based on a LDPC 
algorithm. Privacy amplification is conducted using Wegman-Carter strongly universal 
hashing to reduce the information available to a potential eavesdropper. The user interface 
continuously updates the QBER and the secure key rate. In addition, the QKD PC stores 
quantum secure keys from Alice and Bob and sends them to the encryption device [137].  
 
Figure 4.5 a) Equivalent system schematic. b) Experimental setup. EDFA: Erbium-doped Fibre 
Amplifier. BERT: Bit Error Rate Test 
Figure 4.5 shows the proof-of-concept experimental setup as well as the equivalent system 
schematic. Bob at Node A dynamically shares keys with the Alices in four different nodes via 
an optical switch. Given that the speed of the optical switch itself does not currently dominate 
the  system reconfiguration time of the optically switched QKD system, an opto-mechanical 
switch with a switching time of a few milliseconds can be used in this proposed network 
architecture. In the current setup, 1x4 port opto-mechanical switches (Lightwave, 1x4 / 4x1 
latching optical switch module) are employed. Each switch has approximately 1 dB insertion 
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loss and a crosstalk level of -80 dB. Therefore, the effect of crosstalk can be negligible. Owing 
to the limited number of IDQ boxes available, the current setup employs only one pair of IDQ 
Alice and IDQ Bob. Two 1x4 optical switches combine to establish four paths to the same Bob, 
as shown in Figure 4.5(b). Different transmission lengths are mimicked by adding different 
optical attenuations. Four paths with losses of 11.6 dB, 11.1 dB, 10.5 dB, and 15.6dB are used 
in the switching experiments. 
In addition to the quantum channel, a service channel, which consists of an optical fibre pair is 
also connected back-to-back between Alice and Bob units using small form-factor pluggable 
(SFP) transceivers [137]. The service channel, which is shown in Figure 4.5(b) as dark yellow 
lines, was originally designed by the supplier to provide both the clock signal and reconciliation 
function between an Alice and Bob pair. This design is convenient for a point-to-point QKD 
transmission, and the service channel is designed not to be disturbed. Any reconnection of the 
service channel stops the system software measurement on the QKD server. Although the clock 
signal currently cannot be separated out or regenerated without modifying the units in use, 
private communications with IDQ have indicated that it would be possible to split the two 
functions of clock transmission and the reconciliation channel into two separate channels [138]. 
The separated clock is then distributed to all recipients, as shown in the proposed network 
structure, avoiding any loss or jitter of the clock during the switching function. However, this 
would not introduce any change in system performance from the presented experimental setup.  
The classical data transmission is multiplexed with the quantum channel based on the co-
existing schemes. The classical data transmitter (Tx) uses a continuous wave laser operating at 
a wavelength of 1556 nm and modulated by a Mach-Zehnder modulator (MZM) driven by a 
231-1 PRBS 10 Gb/s signal. An Erbium-doped Fibre Amplifier (EDFA) is used to amplify the 
signal. A 0.4 nm filter is added after the EDFA to suppress the amplified spontaneous emission 
noise, which is not shown in the schematic. After transmission along the same fibre as the 
quantum signal to Bob, the classical data is demultiplexed and amplified by another EDFA to 
compensate for the channel loss. A 0.4 nm filter is used again for noise reduction. Then the 
classical data is detected by a conventional photodetector and measured by a bit error rate 
tester (BERT).  
The discussion channel between the PC in Bob of Node A and each PC in Alice of Nodes 
B/C/D provides the routing signals for controlling the optical switch. This was originally an 
electrical signal from the PC but is converted into the optical domain using media converters 
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(an ethernet switch with SFP ports) at a wavelength of 1531 nm, which is also multiplexed into 
the quantum channel and classical data channel using WDM couplers and transmitted to Node 
A. The routing signal from Alice is split out and read by the PC (PC-Bob) via a media converter, 
and a high-speed Digital Input/Output (DIO) Card (ADLINK, PCIe-7360) in PC-Bob 
electronically controls the optical switch and routes the quantum signals onto the required path. 
Quantum signals from the Alice in the desired Node pass through the switch and are read by 
Bob. A 1310 nm wavelength filter (about 80 dB extinction) is used at the receiver end of the 
quantum channel to avoid an increase in QBER due to the classical channel crosstalk.   
Owing to resource constraints, the multi-user system was virtualised by server-client threads 
by designing a network program based on C# coding. As previously mentioned, two 1x4 optical 
switches are combined to establish four paths to the same Bob. The software enables sending 
switching commands as routing signals from PC-Alice to PC-Bob based on two regimes: 
periodic mode or request mode. Before the start of key transmission, the connection between 
PC-Bob and PC-Alice is established by knowing each other’s IP address. Then, PC-Bob waits 
for commands from Alice. If ‘periodic mode’ is agreed between Alice and Bob, PC-Bob 
controls the optical switch via the DIO card and changes the path after every time period 
without a command from PC-Alice. The time period can be defined by users, based on the 
secure key rate and the required number of keys for encryption in the corresponding path. PC-
Bob will stop changing switch states as long as it receives a ‘termination’ command from Alice. 
On the other hand, if “request mode” is chosen, each virtual Alice client sends remote ‘request’ 
commands to PC-Bob upon the need of key transmission. At PC-Bob, the requests are queued 
by receiving time. The first request is processed and controls the switch state to set up the 
corresponding connection for a user-defined period, while subsequent requests are placed on 
hold. Thus, all the requests are processed in order, and each switching period is defined as the 
time needed for the collection of sufficient number of keys for each path.  
4.4 Experimental results 
Figure 4.6(a) shows the real-time measurement of QBER for each path without coexistence 
with the classical channel and routing signal in the same fibre. The switch is controlled under 
the periodic mode with 5-minute measurements for each path. The different colours indicate 
the different paths from Node A to virtual Node B, C, D, E, respectively, using ‘A-B’ ‘A-C’ 
‘A-D’ ‘A-E’ for short. As previously mentioned, the transmission losses of those paths are 
11.6 dB, 11.1 dB, 10.5 dB, and 15.6dB, respectively, (corresponding to a fibre length of 
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33.1 km 31.7 km, 30 km and 44.6 km, assuming an attenuation coefficient of 0.35 dB/km at 
1310 nm). QBER measurements are continuously conducted without any interruption when 
changing the path. The average QBER is approximately 2.6% for the path A-D with the 
minimum transmission loss. As expected, the path with a higher channel loss has a higher 
QBER due to the dissipation of quantum signal during the transmission. The average QBER 
increased to around 3.2%, 3.6%, and 4.1% for the paths A-C, A-B, and A-E, respectively.  
 
Figure 4.6 (a) The real-time measurement of QBER with path reconfiguration for the quantum 
channel only (without the classical signal and routing signal being co-existed in the same fibre). 
The legend indicates the switch states, e.g. A-B stands for the connection from Node A to Node 
B. (b) Corresponding average secure key rate measured for each path. The error bars indicate 
the standard deviations in the measurements for each path.  
Secure keys are continuously generated between four virtualised Alice-Bob pairs and stored in 
the QKD PC for the purpose of encrypting classical communication. The secure key rate 
measurements are also updated in the software. The average secure key rate at each path is 
plotted in Figure 4.6(b) with standard deviation error bars for the 5-minute measurements. The 
legend shows the corresponding equivalent transmission distance. A maximum Secure key rate 
of round 1.8×103 bits/s is obtained for the path A-D with the minimum channel loss of 10.5 dB, 
equivalent to a transmission distance of 30 km. As the QBER increases over a longer 
transmission distance, the corresponding secure key rate falls to round 1.6×103 bits/s, 1.3×103 
bits/s and 736.3 bits/s for the equivalent transmission distances of 31.7 km (path A-C) 33.1 km 
(path A-B) and 44.6 km (path A-E), respectively.  
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Figure 4.7 (a) The real-time measurement of QBER with path reconfiguration for the quantum 
channel multiplexed with the classical channel and routing signal. The legend indicates the 
switch states, e.g. A-B stands for the connection between Node A and Node B. (b) 
Corresponding average secure key rate measured at each path. The error bars indicate the 
standard deviations in the measurements for each path.  
The classical data and routing signals are then added to the transmission via WDM couplers 
and the measurements are then repeated for each path. The launch power is fixed to -10 dBm, 
to minimise the noise due to the leakage to the QKD channel. The measurements are plotted in 
Figure 4.7. The average QBERs were obtained as 3.6% 3.3% 2.7% and 4.1% for the Paths A-
B, A-C, A-D, and A-E, respectively. The similarities between Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7 
indicate that the classical signal and routing signal in the experiment do not affect the quantum 
channel due to the additional 1310 nm filter at Bob (after demultiplexing) which has more than 
80 dB extinction against the 1550 nm band. The effective Q factor of the received classical 
data was calculated to be 21.4 dB, both with and without QKD transmission, which indicates 
that the classical data transmission is error-free and unaffected by QKD transmission. 
To investigate the system reconfiguration time, the switching time is first measured. The delay 
between sending the electrical routing signal from the DIO card and the arrival of photons at 
the detector indicates that the switching time is less than 3 ms. In the normal operation of the 
IDQ QKD system used in the experiment, the start-up takes an extended time, as the system 
automatically conducts the alignment of timing information as well as determining appropriate 
parameters for the connected Alice- Bob pair. This may take about 20 minutes. As mentioned 
in the previous section, this corresponds to the initialization time contribution to the system 
reconfiguration time. However, it can be seen from the measurements in Figure 4.6 and 
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Figure 4.7 that the quantum signal transmission carries on without the need to restart and 
initialize the system ab initio each time the experiment switching between different virtual 
Alices. In a practical implementation with physically-distinct Alice elements, it is feasible to 
broadcast the clock signal from a single source, and to save the timing and frame information 
(as well as other system parameters) and reload from/to the QKD PC them for each Alice and 
Bob pair as soon as the link is switched to connect them [138]. It will then greatly reduce the 
reconfiguration time to recommence key generation from where it left off last time, rather than 
the minutes required at the moment for an automatic start. In the proof-of-concept experiment, 
the clock is ‘distributed’ within the service channel between an Alice-Bob pair, which will not 
make much difference in the reconfiguration time of the network proposed in Section 4.2.    
In addition, it is observed that secure key exchange is achieved by no more than 20 seconds 
after completion of the automatic startup and configuration routines under conditions of 
moderate channel loss (15 dB). As discussed, this time is the final key regeneration time spent 
on accumulating the initial raw key for post processing before beginning the secure key 
exchange for a new connection between a pair of Alice and Bob. This time is clearly dependent 
on the raw key rate and QBER which are a function of the channel loss and the presence of 
interference. This then becomes the main contribution to the system reconfiguration time in 
our experiment without the need for reinitialization for different connections. Hence, it is 
justified to use this time in the prediction of the reconfiguration time of the architecture 
proposed in this chapter, rather than the many minutes required at the moment for an automatic 
start. 
Thus, the proposed modification of the provided QKD enables the use of multiple physical 
Alice and Bob elements while still allowing much reduced system reconfiguration time, which 
is unlikely to be greater than 20 seconds, using the current implementations of the QKD 
equipment in use. This reduced system reconfiguration time, which is much shorter than that 
of currently demonstrated optically switched QKD systems or networks, would significantly 
improve network reconfigurability and increase the overall secure key rate of QKD between 
multiple users. It should be possible to further reduce this time by specifically optimizing the 
protocol and postprocessing for switched QKD systems. This is beyond the scope of this thesis 
and could be addressed in future work.  
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4.5 Summary 
This chapter has demonstrated a novel method for integrating a reconfigurable QKD system 
into a realistic metro network. The network structure is designed for both classical and quantum 
transmission in a metropolitan area. Secure keys are continuously shared between nodes and 
end-users. The system reconfiguration time of the optically switched QKD is greatly reduced 
by broadcasting a master clock to all QKD users, and recalling the initially saved timing 
information as well as other system parameters for different connections. Efficient encryption 
solutions are presented based on both PTP and ETE topologies. Via a series of proof-of-concept 
experiments, the feasibility of the proposed network scheme has been demonstrated.  
In the experiment, Bob continuously shared keys with four virtual Alices at different locations 
via remotely controlled optical switches. The QBER and secure key rate were investigated for 
four different channel attenuations corresponding to transmission distances of 30 km, 31.7 km, 
33.1 km and 44.6 km. The classical data transmission negligibly affected the quantum 
transmission. As mentioned previously, in the physical setup, only one QKD Alice and Bob 
pair was involved, and the multiple Alices were realized by the software and an additional 
optical switch. The use of the clock distribution architecture was predicted to enable key 
reestablishment with much reduced reconfiguration time upon switching between different 
Alice and Bob pairs, with a maximum delay of approximately 20 seconds.  
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Chapter 5  Towards Reconfigurable CVQKD 
network 
5.1 Introduction  
CVQKD systems are promising alternatives to DVQKD systems, in which the secure key is 
encoded in continuous values of amplitude and phase – referred to as quadratures – of light 
[139, 140] and decoded with balanced BHDs. As introduced in Chapter 2, the reference pulses 
for the detection – used as a LO – are either transmitted or generated locally, and are referred 
as TLO and LLO schemes [88], respectively. CVQKD has attracted much research interest in 
recent years, due to its ability to perform in highly noisy environments, its compatibility with 
standard telecommunication techniques, and relatively low cost. Since the first CVQKD 
scheme was proposed [30], different CV protocols have been invented [31-35]. Among these, 
the most implemented and studied protocol is called the Gaussian-modulated coherent state 
protocol (GMCS), which was introduced by F.Grosshans and P. Grangier in 2002 [31]. This is 
therefore also known as the GG02 protocol. Its security has been comprehensively analysed 
theoretically and proven against collective attacks [36] as well as against general attacks [37]. 
Practically, point to point CVQKD key distribution has been shown over longer transmission 
distances of 80 km [45] and 100 km [46], and network field deployment [64].  
In Chapter 4, an effective solution for integrating reconfigurable QKD in the existing metro 
network based on the practical DVQKD system was proposed. Although CVQKD has not been 
commercialized yet and, to the best of our knowledge, reconfigurable multiuser CVQKD 
systems or networks have not been demonstrated so far, it is important to study the feasibility 
of optically switched CVQKD systems, even before they reach the maturity level of practical 
use in metro networks. As CVQKD is a relatively young technique compared to DVQKD, its 
performance in terms of secure key rate has not been practically comparable to a DVQKD 
system and the use of it in practice is still under investigation. CVQKD suffers from lower raw 
data rates compared to recent demonstrations of GHz clock rate DVQKD systems [44, 137]. 
Most practical GMCS CVQKD systems work at a repetition rate of 1 MHz or below. To our 
knowledge, the state of the art secure key rate of a complete GMCS CVQKD system is around 
1 Mbps at 25 km with a 50 MHz repetition rate using a 1 GHz BHD [47]. Although the speed 
of postprocessing after detection is one limiting factor [141], this is not a significant issue as it 
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can be mitigated by  high-performance hardware. It has been pointed out that the computational 
complexity can be significantly reduced by modern GPUs which are able to efficiently process 
huge amounts of data in parallel [45, 142]. The fundamental speed limitation of the CVQKD 
is the noise performance.  
In this chapter, therefore, we first consider the feasibility of a high speed GMCS CVQKD 
system in order to meet the demand of increasing QKD-enabled encrypted classical data traffic 
in metro networks. In particular, we conduct a noise analysis at a high clock rate, showing the 
rate-dependence of the different noise sources. Different noise contributions have previously 
been studied in [98], however, the influence of the system clock rate has not yet been taken 
into account. Then, with a practical GHz bandwidth BHD, which is built around modified 
commercially available components, the feasibility of an optically switched high speed 
(250 MHz) GMCS CVQKD system is experimentally investigated. This part of the work was 
conducted in collaboration with Dr. Rupesh Kumar. 
In addition, we also propose the use of an equalizer for GMCS CVQKD detection to mitigate 
possible overlapping distortion and hence be able to use lower bandwidth BHD at higher rates. 
The reduction in noise due to the distortion in CVQKD detection is investigated via an 
analytical model. This work presented in Section 5.5 was submitted and accepted by IEEE 
Global Communications Conference 2018 [143]. 
5.2 Noise analysis in high speed CVQKD 
As discussed in Chapter 2, in GMCS CVQKD, Alice prepares coherent states |𝛼⟩ = |𝑋𝐴 + 𝑖𝑃𝐴⟩, 
where XA and PA are quadrature values drawn from a set of normally distributed random 
variables, Ɲ(0, VA) , with a variance VA and a mean of zero, and sends them to Bob through the 
quantum channel. At Bob, a BHD is used to randomly measure the X or P quadrature values of 
each state. The quantum channel is characterised by the transmittance T and excess noise ξ. 
Under the Gaussian linear model with additive Gaussian noise, parameter estimation can be 
conducted via Eq. (2.26)–(2.29) in Chapter 2. By estimating the parameter T and the noise 
variances ξ , Alice and Bob can bound Eve’s information and extract the final secure key using 
Eq. (2.30). In order to evaluate the performance of high bit rate CV-QKD systems, it is essential 
to study the behaviour of these noise terms at higher detection speeds. Theoretically, the excess 
noise ξ is assumed to have originated from eavesdropping. But, in practice, ξ can be contributed 
83 
 
by a range of experimental parameters. In the following, we investigate and categorize the noise 
contributions which behave proportionally to the system repetition rate. 
Shot noise variance 
The shot noise variance, N0, is the fundamental vacuum noise fluctuation associated with the 
coherent states. The Heisenberg uncertainty of quadratures is related to this noise variance as 
△x△p≥ N0 [46].  As introduced in Chapter 2, all the parameters of a CV-QKD system are 
expressed in terms of shot noise units (SNU). Therefore, this requires careful and precise 
calibration of N0. In practice, N0 is measured with respect to the LO power at Bob by blocking 
the signal port of the homodyne detector. To meet the Gaussian linearity model for the protocol, 
the BHD is set within the linear regime with sufficient LO power – typically by 106 to 109 
photons per LO pulse. This will also reduce the electronic noise variance in the systems and 
hence the detection is said to be shot noise limited.  
As the repetition rate increases, the LO pulse duration will decrease, assuming a fixed duty 
cycle. The requirement for maintaining the linear relationship between the output and input of 
the detector requires a corresponding increase in the peak power of the LO pulse. In practice, 
this cannot happen indefinitely with an increasing repetition rate, which is limited by the 
maximum power available from the LO laser as well as the optical power handling capability 
of the photodiodes in the BHD in both the TLO and LLO schemes. Additionally, at longer 
transmission distances, optical loss in the channel imposes a further requirement for increased 
peak power of LO pulses with TLO CV-QKD. This power constraint is not present in LLO 
based CV-QKD schemes as the local oscillator power is not affected by channel attenuation, 
since it is locally generated at Bob.  
Imbalance in BHD 
Like the transmitted signal distribution, the measured quadratures at Bob also follow a 
Gaussian distribution, N(0, VB) with a variance VB (Eq. (2.28)) and a mean of zero. The zero 
mean of the distribution is set by balancing the homodyne detector.  
Practically, the BHD output drifts from its balancing condition over time, and hence the 
measured mean value of each quadrature is not maintained constant during the key transmission. 
This can be due to multiple reasons such as temperature fluctuations, drift in data acquisition 
sampling or its clock, variation in the characteristics of the detector electronics, etc. Within the 
total data sampling interval, here 108 samples, this fluctuation in the mean value of the 
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distribution is manifested in the signal variance estimation, VB, and adds extra noise, 𝜉𝑏𝑑, in 
the CV-QKD system. This can be also explained in the following equations:  
Firstly, any imbalance in the BHD results in a finite common mode rejection ratio 
(CMRR= 𝑔/𝑔𝑐) at the output, which is given by [98]: 
𝑈 =
ℎ𝑓
𝜏
𝜌 (𝑔  +
𝑔𝑐
2
( 𝑠𝑖𝑔 +  ))
=
ℎ𝑓
𝜏
𝜌𝑔 (  +
1
2𝐶𝑀𝑅𝑅
( 𝑠𝑖𝑔 + 𝐿𝑂)) 
(5.1) 
where h is Planck's constant, f represents the optical frequency of the laser, 𝑠𝑖𝑔 and  𝐿𝑂 are 
the photon numbers per pulse in the signal and LO respectively,    is the difference in photon 
numbers from each photodiode in the BHD, which is given in Eq. (2.23), τ is the pulse duration 
of the laser pulse, and 𝑔  and 𝑔𝑐  are the differential gain and common mode gain of the 
amplifier at the output of BHD, respectively.  
In Eq. (5.1), the first term corresponds to the quadrature measurements, while the second term 
corresponds to the voltage output due to imbalance of the balanced detector. Clearly, a constant 
imbalance would cause a constant shift in the mean value but would not influence the variance 
in the measurement.  
However, if the balancing condition drifts with time, then this contributes to the excess noise, 
ξbd, which in turn undermines the system performance. This can be then described in SNU as:  
𝜉𝑏𝑑 =
⟨𝜎(𝑡)2⟩Δ𝑡2
𝐺𝜂𝐵
×
( 𝐿𝑂 +  𝑠𝑖𝑔)
2
 𝐿𝑂
≈
⟨𝜎(𝑡)2⟩Δ𝑡2
𝐺𝜂𝐵
×  𝐿𝑂 (5.2) 
where 𝜂𝐵 is Bob’s transmission efficiency, G is the channel efficiency, 𝜎 is the time-varying 
imbalance factor between two different arms of homodyne detection, which is related to the 
CMRR as 𝜎 =
1
2𝐶𝑀𝑅𝑅
 [141], and Δ𝑡 is the period of measurement. 
A typical CVQKD experiment as demonstrated in [39] shows that the excess noise due to 
relative drift in the homodyne output can be negligible for 𝛥𝑡 of 100 ms but increases to an 
observable level of 10-3N0 over a period longer than a few hundred seconds. To mitigate this 
effect, shot noise measurement, parameter estimation and key transmission sessions should in 
principle be conducted repeatedly for different time slots. However, measurements within each 
session need to be conducted over 108 sampling points to reduce the statistical fluctuations [39]. 
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For a system with a 1 MHz repetition rate, only 105 sampling points can be obtained with a 
session of 100 ms, while measurements can be more precisely conducted with 108 sampling 
points for a system with a repetition rate of 1GHz. Therefore, the use of high bit rate CVQKD 
can better mitigate excess noise due to drift in homodyne balancing and hence improve the 
system performance.  
Phase drift noise  
The phase noise in a GMCS CVQKD system, as explained in Chapter 2, contributes to the 
excess noise as 𝜉𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒 ≈ 𝑉𝐴 × 𝑉𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒 [88, 91]. 𝑉𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒 , the variance of the difference between 
the estimated and actual phase of the signal relative to LO, is evaluated differently for TLO 
and LLO schemes.  
In a TLO CV-QKD system, the signal and LO pulses propagate through different optical paths 
inside Alice and Bob. Thermal fluctuations in the path generate a drift in relative phase between 
the signal and the LO. Experimentally, phase noise corresponding to this drift is mitigated by 
periodically sending pilot pulses from Alice to Bob. Bob carries out the relative phase 
estimation of the pilot pulses with respect to the phase of LO. During the reverse reconciliation 
procedure, Alice compensates for the phase drift by phase correcting her transmitted quadrature 
values. The remaining phase noise after phase correction was given in Eq. (2.39).  
In this equation, the term, 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 corresponds to the phase measurement accuracy, which is the 
variance of the difference between the estimated and exact phase values of the pilot pulses. 
This is inversely proportional to the amplitude of the pulse and is considered to be independent 
of the repetition rate [88]. However, inspired by the work in [90], the term 𝑉𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑙 can be 
expressed as: 
𝑉𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑙 =  𝜃𝑐ℎ
2( 𝑡) (5.3) 
Given that 𝜃𝑐ℎ  is the time dependent phase difference between the pilot and signal pulse 
(relative to the LO) when travelling through the transmission channel,   𝜃𝑐ℎ is the relative 
phase drift of 𝜃𝑐ℎ  in one measurement frame  Δ𝑡 , which can be reasonably assumed to be 
constant under normal condition [90]. At high repetition rates the phase noise decreases as the 
relative phase drift experienced by the pulses within the phase sampling period (ie. 
measurement frame) approaches zero. Thus, the excess noise due to this noise increases with 
the time frame Δ𝑡, and is inversely proportional to the repetition rate.  
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In a LLO CV-QKD system, the signal and the LO are generated from two independent free-
running lasers. A phase reference pulse is also generated and sent by Alice with each signal 
pulse. Single and reference pulses are transmitted through the same optical path. Therefore, the 
signal and reference pulses experience the same phase change during their propagation 
(𝑉𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑙 = 0). However, the finite spectral linewidths of the two interfering laser pulses 
creates a phase estimation uncertainty in the reference pulse. The difference between the 
estimated phase value of the reference pulse from the exact phase values contributes to the 
phase noise. The total phase noise in this case is given in Eq. (2.40).   
The 𝑉𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ term in the equation is the relative phase drift between two free running lasers 
with spectral linewidths ΔvA and ΔvB, and can be written as a function of the repetition rate 
frep [88]:  
𝑉𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ = 2𝜋
Δ𝑣𝐴 + Δ𝑣𝐵
𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑝
 (5.4) 
This noise limits the achievable transmission distance of an LLO scheme to a few tens of km 
[91]. With a higher repetition rate, the drift 𝑉𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ becomes smaller and hence the excess 
noise can be reduced. In turn, the system performance improves in terms of the secure key rate 
and transmission distance. From a practical point of view, narrow linewidth lasers are normally 
selected to minimise the phase noise. However, the use of high linewidth lasers are possible in 
systems with higher repetition rates.  
In addition to the conventional LLO-based CVQKD, an LLO-delay line design has been 
recently proposed [88]. This scheme uses delay line interferometers to eliminate Vlinewidth by the 
simultaneous emission of signal and reference pulses. However, Vphase is then affected by the 
noise variance, Vchannel , as in TLO-based CVQKD. 
Quantisation noise 
In practice, excess noise is introduced by imperfect modulation on Alice’s part during the 
preparation of coherent states based on the Gaussian modulation. This happens in the digital 
to analogue convertors (DAC) used for amplitude and phase modulation in the translation from 
discrete bits into voltage levels. The quantisation noise at Alice affects the state preparation 
and that contributes to an excess noise term ℰ𝑞 as [98]:  
𝜉𝑞,𝐴𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒 ≤ 𝑉𝐴(𝜋𝛼
√𝑉𝑞
𝑉𝜋
+
1
2
𝜋2𝛼2
𝑉𝑞
𝑉𝜋
2)
2 (5.5) 
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where, 𝛼 is the gain factor of the amplifier, and 𝑉𝜋 is the voltage required to achieve a phase 
rotation of π. Quantisation noise is also introduced at Bob from the analogue to digital 
converter (ADC)  at the output of the BHD and transimpedance amplifiers (TIA), which is used 
to convert the measured output voltage to the measured quadrature at Bob. This also contributes 
to the excess noise as described in [98]: 
𝜉𝑞.𝐵𝑜𝑏 =
𝜏𝑉𝑞
ℎ𝑓𝑔2𝜌2𝑃𝐿𝑂𝜂𝐵𝐺
 (5.6) 
where ρ is the responsivity of the PIN diodes. Similarly, 𝑉𝑞 is the voltage noise variance of 
ADC due to the limited resolution, and PLO and τ are the peak optical power and pulse duration 
of LO, respectively. 
𝑉𝑞 in both of the above equations stands for the output voltage variance from the converter 
which is applied to the modulators. It is affected by the resolution of the digital to analogue 
conversion [144]:  
  𝑉𝑞 =
𝐿𝑆𝐵2
12
=
𝑉𝐹𝑆
2
12 × 22𝑁
 (5.7) 
where LSB stands for the least significant bit, VFS represents the full-scale voltage range, and 
N is the resolution of the converter in bits.  𝑉𝑞 in both Alice and Bob will typically have system 
speed dependency which comes from the trade-off between the effective number of bits 
available and the sampling rate of the conversion. In Ref. [144], it was shown that 
approximately one bit of resolution is lost for every doubling of the sampling rate. As shown 
in [144], a 1 MHz ADC offers a typical resolution of 16 bits while a 250 MHz ADC has a 
typical resolution of 8 bits.   
Electronic noise  
The electronic noise, Nele, at the BHD is mainly a result of the thermal noise associated with 
the TIA circuit. To detect quantum signals, a homodyne detector must be sensitive enough to 
distinguish shot noise from electronic noise. Electronic noise Nele is therefore measured with 
respect to the shot noise variance and practically expressed in the SNU, which can be expressed 
as [98]:  
 𝑒𝑙𝑒 =
 𝐸𝑃𝑒𝑙𝑒
2 𝐵𝜏𝜂𝐵
𝜌2ℎ𝑓𝑃𝐿𝑂
 (5.8) 
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where NEPele is the electrical noise equivalent power in A/√Hz, referred to the power at the 
input of the TIA. B is the bandwith of the detector. As can be seen, electronic noise (in SNU) 
increases with bandwidth. Lower bandwidth, 10 MHz, detectors are reported to have electronic 
noise 25 dB below the shot noise value, equivalent to 0.003 SNU, measured with a local 
oscillator power of 108 photons per pulse [39]. The GHz bandwidth detector reported in [46] 
exhibits electronic noise of 0.25 SNU, for local oscillator pulses with  a mean photon number 
of 107 photons/pulse. In addition, the electronic noise is proportional to NEP which depends 
on the circuit components but has been shown to generally increase with the repetition rate for 
a given electrical bandwidth [145].  
Please note that the noise analysis in this section assumes that the BHD possesses a high enough 
bandwidth which does not limit the repetition rate of the signal pulses. However, there may be 
an extra noise term: driving a homodyne detector near to its bandwidth limit would cause 
consecutive detected electrical pulses to overlap and thus contribute to additional excess noise. 
This noise contribution will be discussed separately with a proposed efficient solution in 
Section 5.5.  
Based on the analysis of above noise sources, the noise variance Z contributions becomes:  
𝑍 =  0+𝜂𝑇(𝜉0 + 𝜉𝑏𝑑 + 𝜉𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒 + 𝜉𝑞,𝐴𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒 + 𝜉𝑞.𝐵𝑜𝑏) +  𝑒𝑙𝑒 (5.9) 
where 𝜉0 is the system excess noise, which stands for the frequency independent excess noise 
contribution. Each of the above noise components is plotted at different CVQKD repetition 
rates, as shown in Figure 5.1. The example parameters used in the calculation are shown in the 
figure caption. Although some of the parameters may vary with the experimental conditions, 
the estimation shows the practical trend of rate-dependent noise performance. The increase of 
quantisation noise in the plot is shown as ‘steps’. This is because the calculation uses the 
approximation stated in [144], that one bit of resolution is lost for every doubling of the 
sampling rate. The number of bits is assumed to be an integer. It can be seen that the phase 
noise and the noise due to imbalance drifting decrease with increasing repetition rate and can 
be considered negligible in a high speed CVQKD systems. On the other hand, the electronic 
noise and quantitation noise increase with the repetition rate, and become the limiting factor 
for high speed CVQKD implementations. Fortunately, by carefully selecting commercially 
available high bandwidth photodiodes with low electronic noise, it is possible to construct a 
shot noise limited GHz bandwidth homodyne detector. Later, we will evaluate the performance 
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of our GHz homodyne detector built from modified commercially available components and 
study the feasibility of a high speed CVQKD system with the estimated excess noises.  
 
Figure 5.1 (a) Estimation of the noise terms at different CVQKD repetition rates. (b) 
Estimation of the total electronic noise and total excess noise with changing repetition rate.In 
the estimations,  𝐿𝑂 is fixed at 10
7 (with a PLO of 3 mW and a td of 0.5 ns). ηB is set as 60%, 
and VA=10. The time interval 𝛥𝑡 of both shot noise drifting and phase noise drifting is set as 
the time corresponding to the 108 sampling point at different repetition rates. The linewidth of 
the lasers are assumed to be the state of the art value of 1.9 kHz [93]. 𝑉𝜋 and 𝑉𝐹𝑆 are assumed 
to be 5 V and 1 V, respectively. The gain factors 𝛼 and g are fixed at 5 V/V and 50 k A/V, 
respectively. N is 16 bits at a 1 MHz repetition rate and decreases to 8 bits at 250 MHz. The 
bandwidth of detector B is assumed to be four times higher than the repetition rate.   
In order to show the effect of these noise changes on the CVQKD performance, the 
corresponding secure key rates are estimated at different repetition rates from 100 MHz to 
1 GHz for both cases with TLO and LLO (Figure 5.2). The case for the typical repetition rate 
of 1MHz is also plotted as a reference for comparison. Here, excess noise and electronic noise 
at different clock rates are substituted in Eq. (5.9), and secure key rates are estimated using 
Eq. (2.30). Other excess noise contributions which do not change with speed are assumed to 
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be 0.02 SNU. The modulation variance is 10 SNU and reconciliation efficiency is assumed to 
be 95%.  
Practically, the use of the quantum channel can be divided in three sessions. Firstly, Bob 
randomly blocks one session of receiving states for shot noise variance measurements. Then, 
two sessions are used for parameter estimation and key distillation. For security reasons, these 
three sessions are conducted randomly in time. Therefore, in the following calculation, two 
thirds of the raw key are assumed to be used for parameter estimation and shot noise 
measurements, while only one third of transmitted pulses are used for the key generation.  
 
Figure 5.2 Secure key rate as a function of distance at clock rates of 1 MHz 100 MHz, 250 
MHz and 1 GHz in a TLO CVQKD system 
Firstly, for a TLO CVQKD system, the excess noise can be estimated as 0.009 SNU, 
0.018 SNU 0.036 SNU, 0.074 SNU and 0.155 SNU for repetition rates of 1 MHz to 100 MHz, 
250 MHz, 500MHz and 1 GHz, respectively, based on the above analysis. The secure bits in 
each pulse and the maximum transmission distance are reduced with increasing clock rate due 
to the reinforcement of excess noise and electronic noise. The maximum transmission distance 
decreases from 183 km to 128 km, 78 km, 45km and 18km when the repetition rate increase 
from 1 MHz to 100 MHz, 250 MHz 500MHz and 1 GHz, respectively. However, as the 
repetition rate (ie. pulse rate) goes up, a higher secure key rate in bits/second can be achieved 
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over relative shorter transmission distances. The secure key rate per second with a 1 GHz 
repetition rate is highest with a distance below 10 km. At a transmission distance of 30 km, the 
secure key rates are calculated as 1.9 ×104 bits/s, 1.6×106 bits/s, 2.9×106 bits/s, 2.5×106 bits/s 
and Null for repetition rates of 1 MHz to 100 MHz, 250 MHz, 500MHz and 1 GHz, 
respectively. It can be predicted that, the secure key rate can be optimised with system 
repetition rate at certain transmission range. For example, in our simulations, within the 
transmission range between 40 km and 60 km, systems with a 250 MHz repetition rate are 
feasible and offer better performance. However, longer distance key transmission needs to be 
achieved by using a lower repetition rate.  
 
Figure 5.3 Secure key rate as a function of distance at clock rate of 1 MHz 100 MHz, 250 
MHz and 1 GHz in a CVQKD system with an LLO scheme 
The secure key rates for a LLO CVQKD system is plotted in Figure 5.3. the excess noise can 
be estimated as 0.249 SNU, 0.030 SNU 0.047 SNU, 0.085 SNU and 0.165 SNU for repetition 
rates of 1 MHz to 100 MHz, 250 MHz, 500MHz and 1 GHz, respectively, based on the above 
noise analysis. Firstly, the effect of phase noise in the LLO case results in a lower transmission 
distance compared with the TLO scheme. The lower speed repetition rate is thus not practical 
for LLO schemes, due to the challenge of minimizing phase noise between the two independent 
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lasers. Thus, as predicted in our simulations, the 1 MHz repetition rate has the worst 
performance among these cases. 
As the repetition rate increases from 1 MHz to 100 MHz in our simulation, the phase noise 
decreases, and hence better performance can be achieved for a given laser linewidth, Δ𝑣. When 
the clock rate is further increased, the phase noise decreases and becomes less dominant in the 
total excess noise, and then the excess noise due to the modulation error starts to degrade the 
system performance. In turn, the maximum distance decreases with an increased repetition rate. 
Although the maximum key rate is boosted by the repetition rate, the transmission distance 
becomes limited at higher speeds. The maximum transmission distances are calculated as 
89 km, 65 km 40km and 16 km for repetition rates of 100 MHz, 250 MHz, 500MHz and 1 GHz, 
respectively. Similar to TLO schemes, the repetition rate needs to be carefully selected for the 
required transmission range. Our simulation predicts that 250 MHz is feasible for the range of 
a metro network area.  
5.3 Experimental demonstration of a GHz CVQKD detector  
In this section, we experimentally demonstrate a GHz BHD system for CVQKD systems, built 
from modified commercial components. We experimentally test the performance of the BHD 
using the setup shown in Figure 5.4. A CW laser source operating at a wavelength of 1550 nm 
is externally modulated by a 10 GHz amplitude modulator driven by an electrical signal to 
generate 0.4 ns width optical pulses at a repetition rate of 250 MHz. A variable attenuator is 
used to control the LO power launched into the balanced detector, and the power is monitored 
by a power meter together with a 99/1 beam splitter. The LO is then coupled into two reverse 
biased InGaAs PIN detectors. The tuneable optical delay is realized by a fibre stretcher, which 
is installed in one of the paths to ensure the same arrival time from two arms. A variable 
attenuator is used to guarantee balance between the same intensity being incident on each 
detector, and a CMRR of 51 dB is obtained. The differential output current from the 
photodiodes is then amplified by a modified commercial 1 GHz bandwidth transimpedance 
amplifier . The data acquisition is done in real-time via a 20 GS/s oscilloscope. As mentioned 
above, the voltage fluctuations on the power supply enhanced the electronic noise of TIA. This 
effect can be practically expressed as Power Supply Rejection Ratio (PSRR) ratings which are 
normally published by manufacturers for their circuits. To reduce the PSRR of our TIA and 
hence minimise the electronic noise in our BHD system, we powered the TIA by a 12 V battery 
instead of AC power. The reduction in electronics noise is measured to be about 2 dB. The 
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linearity of BHD is investigated by shot noise measurement at different LO powers. The 
variance of the electronic noise is determined by setting the power of the LO to 0 mW.  
 
Figure 5.4 Balanced Homodyne detector experimental setup. AM: amplitude modulator; ATT: 
variable optical attenuator; BS: 99/1 beam splitter; D1 and D2: PIN detectors; TIA: 
Transimpedance amplifier. OPM:  Optical power meter. 
To meet the Gaussian linearity model for the GMCS protocol, the linearity of the built BHD 
has been tested via measuring the output noise variance with increasing LO from 0 to 1×107 
photons per pulse. The measurements are shown in Figure 5.5. The total output variance is a 
sum of the shot noise variance and electronic variance. When the LO power is set lower than 
about 1.5×106 photons per pulse, the output variance is dominated by the electronic noise, as 
shown in the black dotted line. The electronic noise in the system is about 0.0004 mV2 and is 
not changed by the LO power. As the power of LO increased to about 3×106 photons per pulse, 
the output variance from BHD started to be dominated by the shot noise. As shown in the plot, 
the region between 4×106 to 1×107 could be feasible for detecting CVQKD signals using the 
GMCS protocol, which requires a linear relationship between input and output of the detector. 
The shot noise to electronic noise ratio can be obtained as about 9.5 dB, 13.9 dB, 16.8 dB, and 
18.6dB, which correspond to electronic noise values  𝑒𝑙𝑒 = 0.11, 0.04, 0.02, and 0.01 SNU, at 
4.4×106, 6.2×106 , 8.1×106, at 1.0×107 photons per pulse, respectively.  
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Figure 5.5 Output variance measurement as a function of LO power. The green line shows the 
region where the output variance is approximately linearly proportional to LO power. 
 
5.4 Feasibility of optically Switched CVQKD systems   
The secure key analysis model for a GMCS CVQKD system was introduced in Chapter 2. The 
model needs to be modified for a multi user CVQKD system by introducing optical switches 
with additional loss and crosstalk. Thus, the transmission T and excess noise ξ used in 
Eq. (2.32)–(2.34) need to be modified as (in SNU): 
1
𝑇𝑛𝑒𝑤
=
1
𝑇
+
1
𝑇𝑠
 (5.10) 
𝜉𝑛𝑒𝑤 = 𝜉 + 𝜉𝑠 (5.11) 
where 1/Ts is the insertion loss of the optical switch, and 𝜉𝑠 is the additional excess noise due 
to the crosstalk effect. However, unlike the SPD in DVQKD systems, only the portion of 
crosstalk photons which are in the same spatiotemporal and polarisation mode as the LO 
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contributes to excess noise in the desired path [146]. The excess noise 𝜉𝑠  caused by noise 
photons in the matched mode can be expressed as [47]: 
𝜉𝑠 = 
2〈 〉
𝜂𝐵𝛵
 (5.12) 
where 〈 〉 is the average number of noise photons in the matched mode with LO. In our case, 
this is the noise photons from the crosstalk from other paths. Due to the independent free 
running laser sources used in different Alices, the crosstalk in an optically switched CVQKD 
system would not be significant and so can be neglected.  
A basic optically switched GMCS TLO CVQKD system has been experimentally conducted. 
The experimental setup and the equivalent schematic diagram of the optically switched system 
are shown in Figure 5.6. In Alice, the pulse trains with a repetition of 250 MHz from a directly 
modulated laser are split to signal pulses and stronger LO pulses by a 90/10 beam splitter. The 
pulse width is set to about 400 ps. The x and p quadratures of the signal pulses are modulated 
by an amplitude modulator and a phase modulator, using the modulating signal from arbitrary 
waveform generators (AWGs). Specifically, two set of random numbers as quadrature values 
following the Gaussian distribution are generated by the software in advance, and the 
corresponding voltage values for amplitude and phase modulations are then prestored in the 
AWG and used upon request. A 99/1 beam splitter is used for monitoring the signal power 
output from Alice, and a variable optical attenuator is used to adjust the signal variance to the 
desired level with respect to the shot noise. The time delay between the signal and LO is 
adjusted by a delay line, in cooperation with a Faraday mirror and a polarisation beam splitter. 
Thus, the LO pulses and signal pulses are then multiplexed in both time and polarisation at the 
polarisation beam splitter and sent out from Alice. 
The pulses from Alice are sent to Bob via a 1x2 Optic-Mechanical switch, which had a crosstalk 
of -75 dB and loss of 1 dB. Due to resource constraints, different Bobs are virtualised using 
one detection system by using an optical combiner at the outputs of the optical switch. A 
different attenuation is applied to the two paths using optical attenuator to simulate different 
transmission distances. The total transmission losses of the two paths are about 4 dB and 7.5 dB. 
At Bob, a dynamic polarisation controller is used to compensate for the polarisation drift during 
transmission. The LO pulses and signal pulses are then demultiplexed from the polarisation 
beam splitter into different optical paths. A phase modulator in the LO path is used so that Bob 
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could randomly choose to measure either the x or p quadrature of each pulse. The polarisation 
and arrival time of the LO pulses are adjusted to match the signal pulses before being input to 
the BHD, using another delay line with a Faraday mirror and polarisation beam splitter. The 
1 GHz BHD demonstrated in Section 5.3 is used to detect the quadrature values, which are 
captured by a software controlled oscilloscope.  
 
 
Figure 5.6 (a) Equivalent schematic diagram of the optically switched system. (b) Experimental 
setup for the reconfigurable CVQKD systems. All the fibre optic components within Alice and 
Bob are pigtailed with polarisation mentioning (PM) single mode fibres. PD: photodiode; PBS: 
Polarisation beamsplitter; TIA: Transimpedance Amplifier; AM: amplitude modulator; PM: 
Phase modulator; ATT: optical attenuator; PC: polarisation controller. FM: Faraday mirror. 
The inset shows the Calibration of VA. (VA values are fitted as a linear relation with the 
monitored voltage on an oscilloscope) 
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Before signal transmission via a quantum channel, a calibration of VA needs to be conducted 
via a direct connection between Bob and Alice, in order to practically determine the modulation 
variance VA of the sending quantum signals at the output of Alice.  Specifically, Alice sends 
the modulated signal with different variance to Bob, who then measures the corresponding 
variance using the BHD. The optical signal pulse train is monitored by the photodiode in Alice 
before the signal is highly attenuated by the optical attenuator, which is able to be read on an 
oscilloscope as electrical pulses. Four different pairs of VA and the average pulse amplitude 
monitored on the oscilloscope are obtained, as shown in Figure 5.6(b). Thus, the value of 
variance VA can be determined at Alice and will then be announced to Bob for parameter 
estimation after the signal transmission.    
Next, as discussed in the previous section, while the transmission, a number of states are needed 
to be used for shot noise variance calibration and parameter estimation. In addition, pilot pulses 
with higher intensity are periodically sent along signal states from Alice to Bob for 
compensating relative phase drift between the signal and LO paths due to temperature and other 
environmental fluctuations. Therefore, the signal from Alice is sent in packets with a pattern 
illustrated in Figure 5.7.  Each signal packet contains 400 laser pulses, out of which 36 pulses 
are used as pilot pulses and the rest are equally divided into two sections for the shot noise 
calibration and parameter estimation, respectively. Please note that in a complete CVQKD 
system, the packet should be equally divided into three sections instead of two, as one is used 
for the key generation. However, in this proof of principle demonstration, the post processing 
and the final key generation are not included.     
 
Figure 5.7 Illustration of the transmission pattern of signal packets 
The pilot pulses in each signal packet are initially set to have three different phase rotations at 
the output of Alice (0o, 120o, and 240o), as shown in Figure 5.8. When they arrive at Bob, the 
phase is drifted and rotated by an arbitrary angle of θd with respect to the phase of the LO pulses. 
t t0
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Bob then estimates this angle using the measurement of the average X quadrature of those three 
sets of pilot pulses, namely X1, X2, and X3: 
𝜃𝑑 = −𝑡𝑎𝑛
−1 [
𝑋3 − 𝑋2
√3(2𝑋1 − 𝑋2 − 𝑋3)
] (5.13) 
Bob announces this angle to Alice, who will then accordingly offset and correct the phase of 
the transmitted data within this signal packet. Thus, the parameter estimation as well as the 
potential key generation will be in the same phase reference frame between Alice and Bob.   
 
Figure 5.8 Illustration of phase drift in pilot pulses 
In this experiment, the measurement of θd  is shown in Figure 5.9. The discontinuity of the plot 
is caused by the reading from the oscilloscope. Owing to the lack of a continuous data 
acquisition system, the measurement is conducted via block by block data transfer from an 
oscilloscope to a PC. Each point on the plot corresponds to a phase estimation from the 36 pilot 
pulses, and therefore be used to correct the phase of the rest of the signal pulses (364 pulses) 
within the same packet. The plot shows that the measured θd randomly varies between 0 to 360 
degrees. The estimated angles are then used for correcting the phase of Alice’s sending states. 
The data points are an exponential moving average in order to increase the precise in estimation 
of θd. 
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Figure 5.9 Experimental measurements on the phase drift within each signal packet 
The system parameters are then estimated from successive sections in the signal packets using 
Eq. (2.26)–(2.29) in Chapter 2. VA is calibrated to be around 3.5 in our experiment. In this 
demonstration of the feasibility of an optically switched system, the x quadrature of the 
receiving signal states is always measured. Estimations for the two optical paths of the optical 
switch are summarized in Table 5.1. The sampled data is transferred block by block from an 
oscilloscope to a PC, which limits the overall data acquisition speed. Each of the values in the 
table is evaluated from around 5×107 sampling points takes more than 40 mins. To estimate the 
secure key rate of this setup, the electronic noise is measured to be about 0.1 SNU and the 
reconciliation efficiency is assumed to be a typical value of 95%. 
Table 5.1 Parameters and secure key estimations 
 T 𝜉 IAB χBE Estimated Secure key rate 
Path 1 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.06 1.0×105 bits/s 
Path 2 0.16 0.06 0.16 0.14 1.2×106 bits/s 
In this experiment, the signal transmission and parameter estimation can be immediately 
re-established when changing the switching state of the optical switch. Taking the channel 
transmission estimation as an example, Figure 5.10 shows continuous measurements at the 
transition of paths. Each point on this plot corresponds to the evaluation of a data block with 
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1×105 sampling points, which takes about 8 seconds. Although each individual point cannot be 
used for key estimation due to the statistical fluctuation, this plot illustrates the continuous 
signal transmission during optical switching.   
 
Figure 5.10 Continuous estimations on channel transmission with optical switching 
Please note that the above experiment is not a complete CVQKD system but based on the 
optical layer setup in a lab condition. The devices in Alice and Bob are synchronized 
electrically. The postprocessing procedures for key distillation are not included, and the key 
rates are estimated based on the common security analysis introduced in Chapter 2. In addition, 
owing to the constraints of the lack of real-time feedback control, the above setup is not 
automatically operated with respect to mitigating the polarisation drift and temperature changes. 
The calibration is not dynamically adjusted in real-time while operating, which may have 
affected the estimation accuracy. Although we have demonstrated feasibility of the CVQKD 
transmission via an optical switch, addressing the above points would be an important part of 
the future work and more precise estimation could thus be obtained for a complete CVQKD 
system.  
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5.5 Equalization in CVQKD detection 
In all the studies so far, bandwidth limitations in the detector have not been posed as an issue, 
as the case of insufficient bandwidth was not considered. In general cases, high bandwidth 
photodiodes require lower capacitance and hence a reduced active area, thus lowering their 
saturation power which in turn limits the power of LO in CVQKD system with either TLO or 
LLO schemes. In addition, BHD with a lower bandwidth normally offers lower electronic noise. 
Thus, it is more practical and cost-effective to design and use a lower bandwidth detector at 
higher rates.  
However, as mentioned in Section 5.2, if a lower bandwidth detector is used at higher rates, 
then impaired performance may arise from enhanced noise and distortion due to the 
overlapping detected electrical pulses. This was first reported in a CVQKD experimental 
demonstration in [141]. Such an effect is similar to Inter-symbol interference (ISI) in 
conventional telecommunications, in which the spreading of the pulses due to a bandlimited 
receiver results in interference between neighbouring symbols. 
In conventional telecommunications, equalization, either at the transmitter or receiver, can be 
used to mitigate ISI [147]. In this section therefore, after briefly introducing the principle of 
equalization, we propose the use of an equalizer for GMCS CVQKD detection to compensate 
for overlapping distortion. We have investigated the improvement in the quality of detected 
quadrature values of the quantum signal by the application of an equalization method. This in 
turn allows the use of lower bandwidth BHD for a higher repetition rate.  
5.5.1 Equalization Principle  
Feed Forward Equalization (FFE) is often used in communications. It uses an algorithm that 
reduces inter-symbol distortion using weighted linear combinations of delayed versions of the 
received signal. This enables one to overcome impairments caused by variations in the 
frequency and phase response of the system. This principle is illustrated in Figure 5.11. The 
received signal, x(t), which is distorted by the effect of ISI, is input to an FFE with N steps of 
delay with a constant tap delay TFFE. At the nth step, the magnitude of the delayed signal is 
weighted with a factor, an, known as the tap weight. Thus, the equalized output, y(t), is the 
superposition of the weighted delayed versions of the received signal. The mathematical model 
of an FFE can be expressed as [147]:  
102 
 
𝑌(𝑡) = ∑ 𝑎𝑛 × 𝑥(𝑡 − 𝑛 × 𝑇𝐹𝐹𝐸)
𝑁𝐹𝐹𝐸
𝑛=0
 (5.14) 
The tap values need to be optimised to give the corrected values of Y(t) at a point of interest by 
correlation with the original value at the transmitter. Optimisation is normally achieved using 
a training process, which commonly employs the steepest decent approach with the minimised 
mean square error (MSE) with kth steps, for which the algorithm can be written as [147]: 
𝐴(𝑘) = 𝐴(𝑘 − 1) + 𝜇(𝑋𝑟𝑒𝑓 − 𝑋𝐴(𝑘 − 1))𝑋
𝑇 (5.15) 
where A=[a0, a1, a2……an], 𝜇 is the rate of convergence to the optimal solution, and Xref is the 
training sequence.  
 
Figure 5.11 Illustration of the method of FFE. an is the nth tap and TFFE is the delay 
between adjacent taps. 
The equalization process overcomes impairments in the transfer function of the channel by 
effectively inverting this transfer function after detection. This process also enhances any 
electronic noise introduced by the receiver, as illustrated using the frequency response plot of 
the equalization process (Figure 5.12). 
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Figure 5.12 Frequency response resulted from system and equalization, illustrating the 
electronic noise enhancement. 
5.5.2 CVQKD detection with Equalization   
The ISI occurs in the detection of higher rate CVQKD signals when using a lower bandwidth 
BHD. Due to the bandwidth limitations of the receiver, the high-rate laser pulses carrying the 
key information are distorted by the transfer function of the balanced homodyne detector. As 
a result, every detected electrical pulse is spread across adjacent pulses, which can result in 
additional distortion due to the overlapping detected electrical pulses. This causes an increase 
in ξ through a term ξISI, due to ISI and hence reduces the secure key rate. With the aim of 
mitigating this noise term and hence increasing the secure key rate of a CVQKD system with 
a bandlimited balanced homodyne detector, we proposed to use equalization in the CVQKD 
detection system. The schematic of the analytical model is shown in Figure 5.13. When the 
quantum signal arrives at Bob, the Gaussian modulated optical signal is first detected by a 
balanced homodyne detector with a fixed bandwidth (BW). The amplitude and phase values 
are determined at the peak of each measured output from the detector. We have considered 
Gaussian-shaped pulses in [141] with τ=1/BW and used our analytical model to show the 
improvement in CVQKD detection by the use of equalization. CVQKD signal pulses with a 
variance Va of 20 N0, are sent from Alice to Bob over a 20 km long fibre channel. Electronic 
noise in the balanced homodyne detector is assumed to be 0.01 N0. A 5-tap FFE is applied to 
the detected pulses. Prior to detection, a training process is conducted for the FFE using a 
training sequence of 103 reference pulses with 20 dB higher intensity to obtain the optimised 
tap values.  
noise Enhanced noise
System frequency response Equalization frequency response Resulting frequency response 
f f f
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Figure 5.13 CVQKD detection system with equalization. The fibre channel is practically 
modelled as noise and loss, and the electronic noise Nele is added into the detected signal. The 
downward pulse indicates a negative phase value. 
The cross-correlation due to the ISI between the quadrature values is estimated at different 
repetition rate to bandwidth ratios, with and without equalization. Figure 5.14(a) shows that 
interference between adjacent pulses began to occur at a repetition rate about one-third of the 
bandwidth. At greater frequencies the introduction of equalization significantly reduced the 
cross-correlation. We estimated the ISI noise, ξISI, as a function of the cross-correlation C: 
𝜉𝐼𝑆𝐼 =
2𝑉𝐵𝐶
2
𝜂𝐵𝑇
 (5.16) 
In Figure 5.14(b), ξISI is plotted for varying repetition rates. For conventional CVQKD 
detection without equalization, ξISI increased sharply at a repetition rate about one-third of the 
bandwidth which is hence the highest repetition rate bandwidth ratio (the minimum bandwidth 
of the BHD) that should be used in the link without the external excess noise ξISI. It clearly 
shows that the use of equalization enables the lower bandwidth BHD to be used with same 
level of ξISI , and that the bandwidth can be reduced from 3.3 times to twice the system repetition 
rate. For a CVQKD with a 250 MHz repetition rate, the minimum bandwidth of BHD required 
for ξISI =0 can be reduced from 825 MHz to 500 MHz. 
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Figure 5.14 Simulated (a) cross-correlation and (b) ξISI of the detected quadrature values with 
and without the application of equalization. 
5.6 Summary  
This chapter presents a theoretical model which analyses noise behaviours in a high bit rate 
CVQKD system. The repetition rate-dependent noise performance has been firstly investigated 
and discussed with corresponding secure key rates at different transmission distances for a 
GMCS CVQKD system with both TLO and LLO schemes. The repetition rates of 1 MHz to 
100 MHz, 250 MHz 500MHz and 1 GHz are examined. A trade-off between the noise 
influence and system speed is shown for maximizing secure key generation at given 
transmission distances. Our noise analysis predicts that a CVQKD system with a repetition rate 
of 250 MHz can be feasible and provides a higher secure key rate for the range of a metro 
network area. A GHz BHD is then built using modified commercial components, and the 
feasibility of its application in a GMCS protocol is experimentally tested. The feasibility of an 
optically switched CVQKD system is experimentally demonstrated. The secure key rates are 
predicted to be 1.0×105 bits/s and 1.2×106 bits/s for the two paths with estimated transmittance 
of 0.06 and 0.16. A proposal of using equalization in a CVQKD detection system is presented. 
With FFE equalization, the mitigation of inter-symbol-interference noise caused by limits on 
the bandwidth of balanced homodyne detectors is investigated. For a fixed repetition rate, 
introducing equalization can reduce the bandwidth requirement by nearly half. We hope that 
this work will encourage research to explore the applications of classical communication tools 
in quantum communications. 
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Chapter 6  Conclusion and Future work  
6.1 Conclusion 
QKD has been shown to be a promising approach that can provide unconditionally secure 
communications in combination with classical encryption methods. Unlike conventional 
cryptography, where the security is based on computational and mathematical complexities, 
the security of QKD relies on the quantum physical properties of light. Since its first 
introduction in 1984, various QKD protocols have been proposed and demonstrated, which fit 
into two categories: DV and CV QKD. Experimentally, point to point DV and CV QKD links 
have been widely demonstrated over standard single mode fibres, and their performance in 
terms of transmission distance and secure key rate has been significantly improved.  
The maturation of this technique has potentially enabled the use of QKD in today’s metro and 
access telecommunication networks. Therefore, more research has been drawn to realizing 
QKD between multiple users. Optical switching has been shown to be a promising technique 
for establishing cost-effective reconfigurable QKD networks. This thesis has studied optically 
switched QKD in the context of its practical and highly reconfigurable use in the current metro 
network.   
This thesis first reviewed practical point-to-point fibre-based QKD links with different 
protocols. Single photon techniques in DVQKD links were introduced in terms of generation 
and detection. Owing to the immaturity of truly single photon generators, single photons in a 
DVQKD link are practically generated using a highly attenuated laser. The accompanying 
problem of a PNS attack can be mitigated by introducing decoy states. The use of the APD in 
DVQKD detection was discussed, along with its main characteristics. The widely used 
implementation configurations were introduced for the representative DV protocols, BB84 
(with and without decoy states) and COW. Secure key analysis was studied, based on which 
the distance-dependant secure key rates were calculated for these protocols. The review of 
CVQKD links began with the introduction of the detection technique: BHD, which is the most 
distinctive difference from a DV QKD link. Practically, the LO can be either transmitted from 
Alice or locally located in Bob. The practical implementation of CVQKD links using the 
GMCS protocol based on either the TLO or the LLO scheme was reviewed and discussed. 
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Similarly, secure key generation was analysed using the common mathematical model for a 
GMCS CVQKD link.  
6.1.1 Feasibility and limitation of optically switched QKD  
Among the different scenarios for establishing multi-user QKD systems, optically switched 
QKD shows the greatest potential for network integration since it is cost-efficient, and offers 
lower transmission loss and higher flexibility. After a detailed introduction to optical switching 
techniques, optically switched QKD was investigated in terms of its feasibility and issues.  
A mathematical model describing a multiuser QKD system with optical switching elements 
was derived from the common secure key analysis for point to point QKD links. This model 
was then used to theoretically evaluate the performance of a multiuser QKD system with 
optical switching elements. The degradation of secure key generation due to the loss and 
crosstalk introduced by the optical switching element was comprehensively investigated using 
this model. In addition, this model was verified with a series of proof-of-concept experiments. 
The QKD performance in term of QBER was estimated for a basic QKD setup with different 
level of loss and crosstalk an optical switching element would introduce.  
The work presented in Chapter 3 is essential to building reconfigurable optically switched 
multiuser QKD systems. Both theoretical estimation and experimental results indicate that the 
loss must be carefully minimised and the crosstalk needs to be kept below about -20 dB when 
designing or selecting optical switch elements for a practical optically switched QKD system. 
6.1.2 Reconfigurable Quantum-safe metro network 
A novel quantum-safe network solution was addressed in Chapter 4, in which the 
reconfigurable QKD is smoothly and cost-effectively integrated into existing metro 
telecommunication networks to protect classical data traffic. Quantum signals are transmitted 
with classical data along the same fibre between network nodes. The effective encryption 
topologies based on PTP and ETE were presented. The network solution also considered the 
system reconfiguration time, which is the time required to produce secure key material when 
setting up a new connection. It was thoroughly discussed as it limits the reconfigurability and 
hence the overall secure key rate in the network. In the proposed network structure, the system 
reconfiguration time can be effectively reduced by broadcasting a master clock signal to all 
endpoints from a single source.   
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The feasibility of this network was experimentally examined with commercial QKD boxes and 
opto-mechanical switches. Classical data and control signals in the C-band are wavelength-
multiplexed with 1310 nm quantum signal and transmitted along the same fibre between 
different network nodes. The secure keys were continuously distributed between the common 
Bob with four virtual Alices, via different channel attenuations corresponding to transmission 
distances of 30 km, 31.7 km, 33.1 km, and 44.6 km. The QBER measurements for the four 
paths were 2.6%, 3.2%, 3.6% and 4.1%, with secure key rates of around 1.8×103, 1.6×103, 
1.3×103, and 0.7×103 bits/s obtained, respectively. The continuous measurements were 
conducted in the proof-of-concept experiments with software-enabled virtual Alices, and a 
maximum reconfiguration time of 20 s can be predicted for physically distinct Alices in the 
proposed quantum safe metro network. This improves the network reconfigurability and hence 
result in an increased overall secure key rate between multiple QKD users.  
6.1.3 Towards a reconfigurable CVQKD network 
CVQKD is a relatively younger technique but has been shown as a promising alternative to 
DVQKD. Although it has not been commercialized and not been demonstrated with optically 
switched configurations, the advantages of point to point CVQKD using the widely used and 
studied GMCS protocol have been shown such as its tolerance in noisy environments, 
compatibility with classical communication elements, and relative low cost. With the aim of 
supporting a reconfigurable CVQKD system in our proposed network, the following main 
works were conducted in Chapter 5 of this thesis.  
Firstly, CVQKD systems suffer from a lower raw data rate. In order to meet the demands of 
encrypted classical data traffic in a metro network, the feasibility and issues of high speed 
CVQKD in term of noise performance was investigated. The repetition rate-dependent noise 
performance was theoretically analysed for the first time. Based on this analysis, the noise 
behaviour as well as the corresponding secure key rate of CVQKD with both TLO and LLO 
schemes at higher repetition rates of 100 MHz, 250 MHz, 500 MHz, and 1 GHz were 
investigated. A trade-off between noise level and repetition rate was observed when optimising 
the secure key rate.  
Secondly, a GHz BHD has been built and its feasibility in the GMCS CVQKD detection has 
been experimentally demonstrated. Following this, a proof of principle experiment of an 
optically switched CVQKD system with an opto-mechanical switch was conducted. With an 
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optical layer setup of GMCS CVQKD, the quantum signal transmission is routed between two 
virtualised Alice-Bob pairs. The secure key rates were estimated to be 1.0×105 bits/s and 
1.2×106 bits/s for the two paths with estimated transmittance of 0.06 and 0.16.  
Thirdly, a method of using equalization in the CVQKD detection was proposed, and the 
effective reduction of the ISI due to the bandwidth limitation of BHD was analytically 
investigated. FFE, which is the common equalization method used in conventional 
communication, was applied for the first time to improve the quality of CVQKD detection. As 
a result, BHD with lower bandwidth, which is more practical due to its better noise performance, 
higher saturation power, and lower cost, can be designed and used in high speed CVQKD 
detection. This work also aimed to encourage research to explore the applications of classical 
communication tools in quantum communications. 
The work and achievement in this thesis will greatly support ongoing research into the practical 
application and integration of highly reconfigurable optically switched QKD in the present 
metro network.  
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6.2 Future work  
There are several possible works that can be conducted in the future to take the field forward.  
The feasibility of our proposal of a quantum-safe metro network solution with an optically 
switched QKD system has been experimentally demonstrated with a reduced reconfiguration 
time. A pair of commercialized DVQKD systems was in use. As an extension work, more QKD 
devices could be employed in the future and hence the practical implementation of our 
proposed structure with physically distinct Alice/Bob elements could be conducted. In addition, 
the proposed modification of the provided QKD system, including implementation of 
saving/reloading system parameters and the separation of the clock signal from the service 
channel, could be also carried out after discussion with the supplier. 
The development of the routing mechanism could be another important aspect in the practical 
deployment of reconfigurable QKD in our network [148, 149]. The network path optimisation 
principle could be used to reduce the number of necessary QKD devices (Alices or Bobs) in 
the proposed network structure to further reduce the overall cost. 
The 250 MHz CVQKD system experimentally demonstrated in this thesis is based on the 
conventional TLO design. Recently, LLO CVQKD has attracted much research interest due to 
its advantages, including enhanced security and mitigation of the power constraints on LO 
affected by channel attenuation [88]. Experimentally, LLO design is challenged by the 
difficulty of agreeing a common phase reference between the two individual lasers, which 
results in increased phase noise. Fortunately, this problem can be solved by increasing the 
system repetition rate, as illustrated in Chapter 5. The establishment of high-speed 
reconfigurable CVQKD with an LLO scheme to be tested within our proposed network could 
be one promising future work. 
With regard to electronic noise suppression in the built BHD, electronic noise was reduced by 
2 dB by replacing the AC power supply with a DC battery. Further improvements are likely to 
be obtained by the use of a cooling system. In a preliminary test, a dual radiator liquid CPU 
cooler together with several Peltiers was attached to the outer case of the TIA of a BHD, and a 
slight decrease in electronic noise was obtained. Further enhancements can be predicted when 
installing the cooler inside the device, close to the electronic amplifier components.  
The CVQKD experiment presented in this thesis focused on the feasibility study for the optical 
switched system, which is built with a basic optical layer setup. Although it is beyond the scope 
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of this thesis, further improvements to the system could be conducted through post processing 
and key distillation. In addition, the use of automated real-time feedback control and a fast data 
acquisition system (using a high-speed DIO card instead of AWG and Oscilloscope) are likely 
to be future works to improve the practicability and stability of the system, which could be the 
next step towards to the practical deployment of reconfigurable CVQKD in our proposed 
network structure.  
The research into using the equalization methods for CVQKD detection could be further 
investigated. This is an important research direction as it opens the gateway to exploring the 
applications of classical communication tools for quantum cryptography. In Chapter 5, the 
standard FFE equalization algorithm was employed in the recovery of overlapping CVQKD 
signals. Further improvements are likely to be obtained by using other algorithms. Unlike the 
FFE, which corrects the received signal based on the weighted sum of delayed points of the 
signal itself, Decision-Feedback Equalization (DFE)  is an algorithm that recovers the current 
sampling value by eliminating the effect of ISI based on several previously correctly-decided 
sampling point values [147]. The FFE and DFE methods can be used together to mitigate both 
pre-cursor and post-cursor distortion in classical data communication. However, the logical 
decision circuit used in DFE’s feedback loop cannot be applied to CVQKD signals, as the 
quantum signal is modulated with a Gaussian distribution instead of a finite set of levels. 
However, it may be feasible to develop a DFE-like algorithm with offline data processing in 
software, which is not limited by the number of decision levels. At a minimum, it would be 
expected that the DFE like algorithm would provide a performance comparable to the FFE 
algorithm. This is because the DFE section would simply replace the weighted sum of the 
received waveform with the weighted sum of an appropriately selected synthetic waveform. 
Such a development might provide further improvements of the quality of the recovered 
CVQKD signals, and further mitigate ISI noise occurring in the higher rate detection when 
using a lower bandwidth BHD.  
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